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Foreword 5 
FOREWORD 
The cooperation between the Institute for World Economy, Romanian Academy 
and the Institute of World Economics of the Centre for Economic and Regional 
Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IWE CERS-HAS) dates back to 
several years. The cooperation between these institutes has broadened during the 
past years by an extensive exchange of researchers, joint research projects and the 
regular organisation of bilateral workshops on economic issues attracting wide pub-
lic interest. It is our aim to share and disseminate the information and the experi-
ences of academic and policy-oriented research to the wider public. 
The key field of cooperation is Romania’s and Hungary’s EU integration proc-
ess. The emphasis has been laid on the main factors of long term economic and so-
cial development. Recently the main areas of the common research have been the 
short and long term effects of the current economic crisis on the European integra-
tion, focusing especially on the potential structural reforms.  Additionally develop-
ment in the Central and Eastern European region has been investigated with special 
attention to the fragility of the economic structure. The similar development route 
of both countries, based on external resources and export-oriented growth strategy 
facilitate joint research projects, pointing out similarities and differences of devel-
opment trajectories.  
The 9th
This edition includes studies dealing with the most important and current issues 
of the European integration, among others the current financial and economic crisis 
within the European Union, the reform of the economic governance or the interests 
of different players in the next multiannual financial framework debate. Some es-
says concentrate on more specific issues of agriculture or energy policy.  
 Hungarian – Romanian bilateral workshop “Eurozone crisis, member 
states interests, economic dilemmas” took place on 30 November 2012. The work-
shop was organised by IWE CERS-HAS in Budapest after a very successful meet-
ing in Bucharest the previous year. This volume contains the revised version of con-
tributions that were originally presented at the workshop.  
 
Budapest, July 2013 
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THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT FACTORS FOR EU 
Simona Moagăr Poladian 
Eugen Andreescu

 
This paper focuses on the EU financial and economic crisis. The European Union 
has been fighting the second step of the crisis since 2012 and this step seems to be 
more profound that the first. The economic convergence stipulated in the Maas-
tricht criteria for the last phase of the Economic and Monetary Union has not 
brought the planned advantages. On the contrary, the fast developing countries 
have been dragged down by the contagious effects from the Southern part of 
Europe. From the very beginning, the EMU was designated to bring prosperity and 
welfare on a European level, but the present crisis has hit almost all European Un-
ion countries and proved what an important role long-term economic growth and 
economic convergence have. That is why we consider a re-evaluation of the future 
steps guaranteeing a good future in the EU necessary, as these measures could 
stimulate economic growth and lower the unemployment rate. 
Key words: eurozone, criteria, admission 
JEL classification: F15, G01, O52 
This paper consists of four parts, namely: 
1. New rules, new strategies 
2. Rescue measures for the eurozone and the fulfilment of convergence criteria  
3. Romania and the eurozone 
4. Concluding remarks 
                                                 
 Senior Research Fellow, PhD, Director of the Institute for World Economy, Romanian Academy, 
Bucharest, Romania, smpoladian@gmail.com. 
 Senior Research Fellow, PhD, Institute for World Economy “Developed and Emerging Countries” 
Department/ Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania, office@iem.ro. 
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1) New rules, new strategies 
For the first time in IMF history it was affirmed openly that one developed region, 
namely the eurozone, is considered “the ill part of the world economy.” The public 
debt of the eurozone is considered the “main risk” for the world financial stability 
(IMF Report from October 2012). 
 Eurozone tensions have been amplified also on the base of private capital run-
ning from the marginal countries toward the core countries. For example, only in 
the period of June 2011 to June 2012, over 296 billion euros left Spain and 235 bil-
lion euros from Italy, respectively. This process has caused additional credit costs 
for the population and also for the firms in these two countries.  
The main banks operating in the eurozone would assist a substantial diminishing 
of capital by 2,177 billion euros that could provoke a credit shrinkage by 9% until 
the end of 2013 and a blockage of the real world economy if this phenomenon were 
to continue. 
To avoid such a pessimistic scenario, Jose Vinals, Director for IMF Capital Mar-
ket Department suggested the following crucial measures to be implemented: 
 Banking recapitalisation; 
 The closure of “ill banks”; 
 Public finance balance; 
 The application of the European Stability Mechanism and the ECB bonds trans-
fer programme; and  
 A European Banking Union through common observation rules. 
The IMF report drew attention to the lessons that could be learnt from the euro-
zone experience (USA and Japan should learn from it also) because “Easy money 
and lower interest rates of the two eurozone countries that benefited a long period of 
time has convened a misleading security feeling. Delaying the necessary adopting 
rescue measures could lead to future financial and economic confusion that is hard 
to estimate.” 
For Japan, the IMF report stresses the fact that in the following five years the 
public bonds will have an enormous share of 33 per cent from the banking assets, 
that represent a major risk in the circumstance of interest growing on the world 
level. 
The total debt (public and private) of the USA is worsening as it reaches 375 per 
cent of the GDP that means over 16,000 billion euros. 
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2) Rescue measures for eurozone and the fulfilment of 
convergence criteria   
Under the unprecedented financial crisis pressures, the eurozone countries have 
been forced to gradually build all the previously lacking elements for the conversion 
of the EMU into the Optimal Currency Union during the current year. This means 
that all the three missing elements, namely budgetary harmonisation, financial soli-
darity and a banking union are necessary to be implemented for avoiding the 
asymmetric shocks caused by the crisis. 
But achieving these three elements in a short time would require higher social 
and political costs in eurozone and this would be rather intolerable even for coun-
tries with a higher standard of living. 
1. The budgetary pact is the common name for the “European Treaty for Stability, 
Coordination and Governance” that required all eurozone countries to be more 
balanced in terms of public finance. 
2. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could manage funds of up to 700 bil-
lion euros that would help the indebted countries with further loans to lower 
costs but at the same time it would recapitalise the banking system directly 
through the ESM. 
3. The Banking Union foresees the surveillance of the all 6,000-plus banks from the 
eurozone. This was established by Brussels in 18 October 2012. The banking un-
ion was an indispensable element for the Monetary Union due to the fact that 
banking surveillance is a basis for banking recapitalisation through the ESM. 
Spain could be the first beneficiary country by signing an agreement for a credit 
line amounting to 100 billion euros for the banks’ recapitalisation. 
Having all these extremely necessary 3 financial tools (the budgetary union, 
the banking union and financial solidarity) the eurozone would be more prepared 
in case of  further financial turmoil that could happen in the near future. This 
prevention process lets the EU to focus more on solving the more difficult prob-
lems such as the European Economic growth stimulus and diminishing the rate 
of unemployment that is approaching an 11 per cent average. 
4. Unlimited ECB intervention. At the beginning of October 2012, the ECB had 
prepared a declaration that surprised everyone: it would buy limitless bonds from 
the states with financial difficulties if and only if these countries adopted firm 
structural reforms. 
This message has directly led to a lowering of the interest of five-year bonds by 
250-350 pp on the bond market in comparison to the figure a few days previously. 
By taking this decision, the ECB matches the FED or the Bank of England by con-
siderably reducing the possibility of overindebted countries becoming vulnerable to 
bond speculations.  
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This announcement also intended to disappoint any investors who had wished to 
take a short-term risk based on the fears that would be created, knowing that the 
ECB would take these bonds unconstrained. 
The ECB suggestion that bond acquisitions would be “conditional, temporary 
and unlimited” also created confusion because it is difficult to achieve all three at 
the same time since the intervention is possible only for 1-3 years bonds. 
It is worth mentioning that already the majority of the bonds of the marginal eu-
rozone countries is inside the ECB balance. 
What does conditionality mean in this context? It is referring to the signing of an 
agreement with the Troika (of the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission) for 
structural reform implementation. 
The monetary union adjustment into a budgetary and banking union could in 
time lead to a federative European state. This way the ECB is creating a solid eco-
nomic base in preparation for the case of Greece withdrawing from the eurozone. It 
is eliminating the option of a massive selling of the bonds of indebted countries like 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, thus impeding spreading the negative effects. The 
effects of all these four measures could be registered from 2013 onwards. 
In the years that have passed since 2008 when the international financial crisis 
spread throughout the EU, the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
have tried to fulfil the Maastricht criteria enforced for the last stage of the EMU. 
The examination of the convergence criteria referring to the inflation, budgetary 
deficit, public debt, the rate of exchange and the long-term interest among the can-
didate countries highlights the asymmetries among them. For example, in the case 
of Romania, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia the rate of inflation is well 
above the reference value for the eurozone (3.1 per cent). Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public and Sweden, on the contrary, have stayed well within the suggested inflation 
rate. The public debt is a criterion that is almost fulfilled by the candidate countries 
with one exception: Hungary registered a 78.5 per cent of PIB in 2012. 
Table 1 
The fulfilment of the convergence criteria in the candidate countries,  
between 2010 and 2012 
 
Candidate 
Countries 
Inflation (%) 
Budgetary Deficit 
(% of PIB) 
Public Debt 
(% of PIB) 
Rate of Exchange 
(variation %) 
Long-term 
interest 
(%) 
2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria 3.0 3.4 2.7 3.1 2.1 1.9 16.3 16.3 17.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 5.4 5.3 
Czech Rep. 1.2 2.1 2.7 4.8 3.1 2.9 38.1 41.2 43.9 4.4 2.7 -1.8 3.9 3.7 3.5 
Latvia -1.2 4.2 4.1 8.2 3.5 2.1 44.7 42.6 43.5 -0.4 0.3 1.1 10.3 5.9 5.8 
Lituania 1.2 4.1 4.2 7.2 5.5 3.2 38.0 38.5 40.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.2 5.2 
Poland 2.7 3.9 4.0 7.8 5.1 3.0 54.8 56.3 55.0 7.7 -3.2 -2.4 5.8 6.0 5.8 
Romania 6.1 5.8 4.6 6.8 5.2 2.8 30.5 33.3 34.6 0.7 -0.6 -2.8 7.3 7.3 7.3 
Hungary 4.7 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.3 2.5 81.4 80.6 78.5 1.7 -1.4 -6.1 7.3 7.6 8.0 
Sweden 1.9 1.4 1.3 +0.3 +0.3 0.3 39.4 38.4 35.6 10.2 5.3 1.9 2.9 2.6 2.2 
Reference 
value 
- - 3.1 - - 3.0 - - 60.0 - - ±15% - - 5.8 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat database, 2012 
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From 2001 until the beginning of 2010, the emerging Europe experienced: 
 Large capital inflows from the EU (see table 3); 
 A credit eruption; 
 A rapid extension in consumption and investment; 
 Debt denominated in foreign currency with great threat of exposure to a drop of 
the nominal exchange rate; 
 Since foreign banks contributed to credit booms and external debt accumulation 
in the emerging Europe, the overall effect of financial integration on the crisis in 
this group of countries appears to have been mixed. 
 While foreign banks had a stabilizing effect in the crisis, this mainly took the 
form of neutralising imbalances that theythemselves had helped create in previ-
ous years. 
If GDP per capita expressed in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) varied from 
45 per cent to 274 per cent of the EU average PIB in 2011, in the case of the NMS it 
was around 45 to 66 below the EU average. The Czech Republic is the only candi-
date country that was around 80 per cent below the average. 
Table 2 
GDP/capita classification of the European candidate countries 
(at pps) 
 
Countries 
GDP/capita expressed in PPS in comparison to the 
EU average 
Czech Rep. 80 
Poland 65 
Lithuania 62 
Hungary 66 
Latvia 58 
Romania 47 
Bulgaria 45 
Source: Eurostat/20 June 2012 
 
Moreover, the trade integration between the older EU member states and the new 
member countries ranged from 50 to 80 per cent from the total trade. Also for the 
NMS the investment flows of the eurozone countries is over 77 per cent of the total 
ISD (see table 3). 
Table 3 
ISD inward flows in the candidate countries 
 from EU and the eurozone, in 2011 
 
Candidate Countries UE-27 Eurozone 
Bulgaria 88.8 87.4 
Czech Rep. 89.0 84.3 
Latvia 77.7 51.0 
Lithuania 80.2 41.0 
Poland 86.5 78.2 
Romania 90.7 86.2 
Hungary 77.4 74.5 
Source: Moody’s investors service, August, 2012 
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But the economic and financial problems from the eurozone countries has spread 
concerns over the candidate countries and the figures below show the current offi-
cial position throughout this group of countries (see table 4). 
Table 4 
The official position concerning the eurozone admission 
 
  October 2010 –official position  Current official position 
Bulgaria 2014 No official date 
Czech Rep. 2015 No intention to join at the moment 
Latvia 2014 2015-2016 
Lithuania 2014 2015-2016 
Poland 2015 No official date 
Romania 2015 No official date 
Hungary 2014 Beyond 2020 
Source: official declarations 
3) Romania and the eurozone 
What is happening in Romania? In November 2012, the Governor of Romania, 
Mugur Isarescu, declared that the eurozone admission date of 2015 is no longer a 
realistic one. 
Explanations could be found in the following causes: 
1. Romania does not fulfil all the Maastricht criteria (see table 5); 
2. Romania is waiting to see when the financial problems of the eurozone would be 
solved; 
3. Restructuring measures for macroeconomic stability are necessary prior to the 
admittance into the eurozone; 
4. Regarding its GDP, Romania is occupying the 17th place among the EU-27, with 
136.4 billion euros (cf. Hungary’s 100.7 billion euros); 
5. GDP/capita at ppp is 12,300 euros (Hungary’s is 16,500 euros at ppp); 
6. The Romanian GDP represents 1 per cent of the total EU GDP. 
Romania is fulfilling only three from the five criteria. As previously shown, Ro-
mania does not fulfil the inflation criterion as that is the highest in the whole EU 
(5.8 per cent in the 2011-2012 period. The long-term interest criterion is not ful-
filled either, it being too high in comparison to the EU average (see table 5) 
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Table 5 
The Romanian criteria fulfilment in the 2010-2012 periods in comparison to the reference 
value for eurozone 
 
 
Inflation (%) 
Budgetary Deficit 
(% din PIB) 
Public Debt 
(% din PIB) 
Rate of Exchange 
(variation %) 
Long-term 
interest 
(%) 
2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012
*
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Romania 6.1 5.8 4.6 6.8 5.2 2.8 30.5 33.3 34.6 0.7 -0.6 -2.8 7.3 7.3 7.3 
Reference 
value for 
eurozone 
admittance 
- - 3.1 - - 3.0 - - 60.0 - - ±15% - - 5.8 
Source: NBR database, 2012 
Concluding remarks 
Presently, it seems that even the Europeans would be willing decide to abandon the 
euro; it does not appear to be possible any more. Christine Lagarde affirmed that 
“the total debt of developed countries has reached 110 per cent of the GDP and it is 
already at the same level as it had been during the Second World War.” 
The euro is already a universal currency and the most important countries and 
regions are based on the euro, the dollar and the renmimbi (Chinese authorities al-
ready would prefer the gold convertibility for the renmimbi). The Chinese, the Rus-
sians, the emerging countries and the Americans do not agree to this scenario be-
cause the US. dollar would appreciate too much and this would affect exports. Rus-
sia has 60 per cent of the total commercial trade in euros. 
In our opinion we should learn from the actual crisis that the state as public ad-
ministrator must to regain its position because of the dynamic of the social prob-
lems that has become more and more uncontrolled and dangerous due to the sus-
tained crisis. The real existing problem in the EU states is the high rate of unem-
ployment, especially in the southern EU countries. A solution to this crisis could be 
a long-term equilibrium between the private and the public responsibility; to 
achieve this the role of the state needs to be intensified since many analysts are pre-
dicting a decade of austerity from now on. The ending of the cold war and the open-
ing up of the world have created the opportunity for some countries like China, In-
dia and Brazil to become world powers and the ideological importance has been re-
duced substantially. That is why not only the NMS but the entire EU should make 
significant steps toward improving competitiveness. The sectors that are not com-
petitive in the market continue to be important indicators that partially explain the 
gap between the EU countries and delay the construction of an Optimal Monetary 
Zone. The “asymmetric shocks” should be analysed in all profound aspects when a 
candidate country is in support of the euro adoption. We should learn from the ex-
isting difficulties of the eurozone with a determination to avoid comparable difficul-
ties in the coming years.  
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THE EUROZONE CRISIS FROM THE  
FRENCH POINT OF VIEW

 
Mikós Somai  
Abstract 
There is a growing concern among politicians, decision-makers and experts about 
France’s poor economic performance of the last couple of years, and its possible 
effects on the Franco-German relationship, so far the main driving and accelerat-
ing force of the European integration. Being off track for too long, France runs the 
risk of losing more and more ground against Germany, which may cause important 
shifts in balance of forces within the EU. The main aim of my paper is to compare 
France’s economy to that of Germany, to display and analyse the state of French 
public finances, as well as the country’s role in the eurozone crisis management, 
and to make a short assessment of the first achievements of the new leftwing gov-
ernment. 
JEL: E00, G01, H50. H60, O11 
The biggest problem of the French economy is its slowing growth trend. But it is only 
at the surface. At the root of the problem, there is something much deeper, something 
lasting and significant: the country’s worsening international competitiveness. Unfor-
tunately, this is not a new phenomenon at all. But while the trend has been around for 
decades now, the global crisis made the weaknesses of the French economy and a 
steady loss of competitiveness relative to that of its main integration partner, the 
German one more evident. Also, the scoreboard – this early-warning system created 
as part of the Six-Pack and intended to trigger in-depth studies searching for the na-
ture of macroeconomic imbalances – clearly displays that the German economy is 
built on a much stronger basis than the French one (see table 1). 
                                                 
 A paper presented at the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop “Eurozone crisis, member 
states interests, economic dilemmas” held on 30 November, 2012 at IWE 1122 Budapest, Budaörsi 
út 45. 
 Miklós Somai is a senior research fellow at Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of World Economics (IWE) 
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Table 1 
Scoreboard-indicators for France and Germany covering the major sources 
of macro-economic imbalances 
(the dark background indicates which one of the two countries’ performance is weaker) 
 
 
France  Germany 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Thresh-
old 
value 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Current account 
balance 
-0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -4/6% 6.3 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.9 
NIIP -1.5 -12.9 -9.4 -7.8 -15.9 -35% 26.5 25.4 33.8 34.9 32.6 
Δ real effective ex-
change rate 
0.2 2.7 2.9 -1.2 -3.2 ± 5% 0.6 2.4 3.2 -2.9 -3.9 
Δ shares of world 
exports 
-18 -21.5 -10 -13.4 -11.2 -6% 2 -5.3 -4.6 -7.2 -8.4 
ΔULC 5.4 6.8 8.8 7.7 6 + 9% -3.7 -0.6 7.2 6.8 5.9 
Private debt 142.5 149.9 156.8 158.6 160.4 160% 122.3 123.6 130.5 127.2 127.8 
Δ private credit flow 12.6 9.1 -1.8 1.8 4 +15% 3.6 3 1.8 3.1 4.8 
Δ house price index 4.4 -2 -6.6 3.9 n.a. +6% -3.6 -0.3 0.8 -1 n.a. 
General gov. debt 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 86 60% 65.2 66.8 74.5 82.5 80.5 
Unemploy. rate 9 8.5 8.6 9 9.7 10% 10.1 8.8 8 7.5 6.9 
Source: Eurostat (web) Current account balance in % of GDP – 3 year average; NIPP = net interna-
tional investment position in % of GDP (annual data); Real effective exchange rate – 3 year % 
change (annual data); Shares of World exports – 5 year % change; ΔULC = nominal unit labour cost 
index (2005 = 100) – 3 year % change; Private debt in % of GDP (annual data); Private credit flow 
in % of GDP (annual data); House price index (deflated) – 1 year % change; General government 
gross debt (Maastricht debt) in % of GDP (annual data); Unemployment rate – 3 year average. 
 
 
With the exception of 2009, economy in Germany grew at a higher rate than in 
France for each of the years since 2005 (see figure 1). For the entire period of 2005-
2012, this resulted in a difference in GDP-growth rate of more than 1:2, since the 
German economy achieved a cumulative growth of 11,1%, while the French one a 
mere 5%. 
It is true that such diverging growth patterns may have already been observed in 
the two countries’ long-term development (see figure 2). Therefore, it seems quite 
normal for their GDP growth lines to swirl around and cross each other approxi-
mately every 10-plus years, as they did for the last two and a half decades. How-
ever, the current divergence period, in place since 2007, is unique in that it coin-
cides with the global financial and economic crisis, which in turn found the two 
countries in very different economic and social situations: on the eve of the crisis, 
enormous structural changes had already been made in Germany, while in France 
these changes were still to come. 
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Figure 1 
Cumulative real GDP growth of France and Germany since 2005 
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Source: Eurostat (web); for data concerning the year of 2012: Destatis (web) and Insee (web) 
 
 
The gap between the two countries’ long-term perspectives was widening further 
by the diverging economic policy measures implemented in the two capitals during 
the first years of the crisis. In Berlin, they restricted the salaries, boosted the exports 
and brought the public finances under control by 2011. In Paris, they hoped to over-
come the crisis by the strength of the internal consumption and let the deficit rise 
high above the level allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The French govern-
ment started to put forward mild austerity packages only in late August 2011 – prac-
tically three years after the outburst of the crisis – and the new left-wing coalition, 
in power since mid-May 2012, has both very little propensity and political space to 
introduce comprehensive structural reforms.  
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Figure 2 
Real GDP growth patterns in Germany and France since 1971 
(annual % growth) 
 
Source: Eurostat (web); for data concerning the year of 2012: Destatis (web) and Insee (web) 
 
 
This diverging growth path of France and Germany has recently been revealed 
and pointed out in an OECD publication, too.1 While in Germany the so-called 
“composite leading indicators” (CLIs), which are designed to provide early signals 
of turning-points in business cycles, fluctuations in economic activity around its 
long-term potential level, point to a stabilisation in growth prospects, in France 
growth is expected to remain weak (see figure 3). 
Figure 3 
OECD Composite Leading Indicators for France (on the left) 
 and Germany (on the right) 
 
Source: OECD (2013) page 2 – Triangles mark confirmed turning points of the CLI, which in turn 
tend to precede turning points in economic activity relative to long-term trend – represented here by 
the horizontal line at 100 – by approximately six months. (For detailed method: see OECD (2012) 
 
                                                 
1 OECD (2013) 
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Apparently, France is at a crossroads: with its slowing economy, persistent pub-
lic and widening current account deficit, enormous public debt and unemployment, 
low and stagnating investments, either the country brings about deeper structural 
reforms – especially in the field of basic social services like the untenable pension 
system – or it runs a risk of the European balance of power being irrevocably 
changed, and Germany becoming not only the economic but also the political centre 
of Europe. 
Public finance scenario 
The trajectory of how to create order in French public finances has been set in the 
country’s Stability Programme, in which Paris took the engagement to reduce the 
government deficit to 3 per cent of the GDP by 2013 and to restore the structural 
balance of public finances by 2016.2 The stability programme is renewed yearly, the 
main data having to be adjusted in relation to changes in the macroeconomic path of 
the country. Only one thing is set in stone: the objective of a 3 per cent budget defi-
cit for 2013 (see figure 4). The outgoing right-wing government was most anxious 
about this objective and over-fulfilled it in both 2010 and 2011. However, the slow-
ing down of economic growth as of the end of 2011, the higher-than-previously- 
Figure 4 
France’s multiyear public finance trajectory 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat + European Commission (2012) – France Stability Programme 2012-2016 
                                                 
2 European Commission: France Stability Programme 2012-2016: 9  
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prevailing debt refinancing interest rates, and the special responsibility of France 
(together with Germany) in tackling the eurozone crisis put further pressure on pub-
lic debt, so the planned decrease of this latter might be postponed by years. 
France’s participation in the eurozone crisis management 
When Europe’s future is at stake the Franco-German cooperation always returns to 
the centre of attention. During hard times, this duo has special responsibility to 
reach a consensus of their own regarding the main policy directions to be followed 
by the European integration.  
As already mentioned, differences in economic policy philosophy – and espe-
cially in the field of fiscal discipline – between the German and the French, and 
more generally between the stricter Northern and the more permissive Southern 
European approach, reappeared at the beginning of the crisis. The convergence of 
approaches only took place at early 2010 when the situation in Greece started to 
worsen dramatically and the French counter-cyclical economic policy yielded al-
most no results. Paris began to realise that the programme of small steps in the field 
of modernising/rationalising the public administration – e.g. to replace only every 
second retiring civil servant – could be insufficient and more comprehensive struc-
tural reforms would be needed to restore competitiveness. A consensus was about to 
emerge between France and Germany on the prospect that there would be no sus-
tainable growth without getting their public finances in order and that there should 
be no financial transfers to support member states in case they did not commit 
themselves to take the necessary steps into this policy direction.  
Therefore, Paris and Berlin were becoming more and more engaged as active 
partners in their efforts to strengthen the EU economic governance. The main objec-
tives of this are to ensure fiscal discipline and stabilisation in the European econ-
omy and to prevent a new crisis from happening. Other priorities are to promote 
sustainable growth and employment, which in turn could help further social and 
economic policy targets to be met.3 This growth, however, should not push the in-
flation rate too high. But – and there is still some conflict between the interpreta-
tions of Berlin and Paris – the internal market and investments, as sources of com-
petitiveness, have as much of a role in growth promotion as exports. This growth 
should also be supported by the domestic demand of countries with large external 
surplus; otherwise the efforts of some EU member states to reduce the deficit in 
their current account become totally meaningless.4   
 
                                                 
3 „To combat poverty and support vulnerable groups” appears as an important target in the Conclu-
sions paper of the European Council of 28/29 June 2012. See: European Council (2012): 8. 
4 See: Fillon (2010): 8 – A clear allusion to Germany’s responsibility for the build-up of huge imbal-
ances in the balance of payment terms, as the country consistently runs 60 per cent of its trade sur-
plus vis-à-vis the eurozone. (Ibid. 3) 
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Despite the remaining differences in their views, France and Germany have 
come a long way in the field of European crisis management. They came to an un-
derstanding about rescue plans for Greece, which turned the principle of no-bailout, 
seen by Berlin as taboo, obsolete.5 In return, Paris agreed to make the financial res-
cue packages conditional upon the implementation of stringent austerity pro-
grammes in the member states concerned; programmes having always been seen in 
France as inefficient at times of crisis. The tight cooperation of the two leading 
European partners was crucial in the creation of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) in May 2010, its strengthening and enlargement in July and October 
2011, and finally its perpetuation in the form of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) in October 2012.  
Considerable progress has also been achieved in the area of economic govern-
ance. In October 2010, the two countries reached an agreement on the reinforce-
ment of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), incorporated into the so-called Six 
Pack which has been in force since 13 December 2011. Further milestones in 
Franco-German cooperation were marked by the European Semester, the Euro-Plus 
Pact and the European Fiscal Compact. The latter – formally called the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union – 
introduced an even stricter mechanism than that of the Six Pack, by requiring con-
tracting parties to converge towards their medium-term objective, as defined in the 
SGP, with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 per cent.6  
The Fiscal Compact – as a live issue at the time with a very restrictive character 
– emerged as one of the main themes of the French presidential election campaign 
in 2012. This intergovernmental agreement was signed by 25 EU Member States 
(all but the UK and the Czech Republic) just a couple weeks before the first round 
of the election. Francois Holland, the then Socialist Party candidate, had pledged to 
re-negotiate the Fiscal Compact in order to include growth measures, in case he 
won. At the end, this election promise has gone the same way as so many others; it 
was in no way realised as it had been promised. The French Parliament ratified the 
Fiscal Compact as it had been signed by the outgoing President Nicolas Sarkozy – 
not a word had been changed in it.7 At the European Council of June 2012, how-
ever, after convincing his European partners of the need for flanking measures to 
stimulate economic growth, President Holland obtained a modest package of €120 
billion (equivalent to around 1.0 per cent of EU GNI), the Growth Compact in EU 
slang, designed to boost the financing of the European economy.8 
 
                                                 
5 See: Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty whereby neither the EU nor any of its Member States “shall 
be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public au-
thorities” etc. of any (other) Member State. http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-
treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-andcomments/part-3-union-policies-and-
internal-actions/title-viii-economic-and-monetary-policy/chapter-1-economic-policy/393-article-
125.html.  
6 1.0 per cent of the GDP if the Member State has a debt ratio significantly below 60 per cent of the 
GDP. See: European Commission (web). 
7 The Fiscal Compact entered into force on 1 January 2013 for the 16 EU Member States which 
completed the ratification prior to this date. See: Council (2012).   
8 For further details, see: European Council (2012): 10-12. 
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At the above-mentioned EU-summit of June 2012, however, the Growth Com-
pact was far from being the most interesting topic. The possibility had been raised 
that institutions (most notably the ESM) established to finance rescue packages for 
the euro area Member States could – naturally, only under strictly defined condi-
tions – recapitalise banks directly.9 The vicious circle between banks and sovereigns 
could, in this way, be broken. In other words: this would prevent the euro area gov-
ernments’ bank-saving programmes from turning automatically into sovereignty 
crises. Naturally, in order to realise this plan, member states first need to agree on 
the establishment of a single supervisory (SSM). The starting point for such an 
agreement – but also as a first step towards an integrated “banking union” – may be 
the proposals on the SSM put forward by the Commission on 12 September 2012. 
They also include components such as a single rulebook, common deposit protec-
tion and a single bank resolution mechanism.10 
Table 2 
Euro area Member States’ shares in guarantees that back up the EFSF’s effective lending 
capacity of €440 billion 
 
Eurozone Members 
Original 
EFSF(ECB) contri-
bution key (%) 
EFSF amended1 
contribution key 
(%) 
ESFS amended1 guarantee commitments 
(€ bn) of € 440 bn 
Germany 27.06 29.07               211.0     47.96% 
France 20.31 21.82               158.4     36.00% 
The Netherlands 5.70 6.12                 44.4     10.10% 
Belgium 3.47 3.73                 27.1     6.15% 
Austria 2.78 2.99                 21.7     4.93% 
Finland 1.79 1.92                 14.0     3.17% 
Luxembourg 0.25 0.27                  1.9     0.44% 
Estonia 0.26 0.28                  2.0     0.46% 
    
First class
2
 guaran-
tors:               480.5     109.21% 
Italy 17.86 19.18               139.3     31.65% 
Spain 11.87 12.75                 92.6     21.04% 
Slovakia 0.99 1.06                  7.7     1.75% 
Slovenia 0.47 0.50                  3.7     0.83% 
Cyprus 0.20 0.21                  1.6     0.35% 
Malta 0.09 0.10                  0.7     0.16% 
    Other guarantors:               245.5     55.79% 
Ireland 1.59 -  -  -  
Greece 2.81 -  -  -  
Portugal 2.50 -  -  -  
  100.00 99.72               726.0     165.00% 
Source: EFSF (web); 1 = The amended contribution key takes into account the stepping out of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 2 = countries rated AAA or AA by S&P, i.e. having extremely or very 
strong capacity to meet their financial commitments. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Council (2012) 
10 Commission (web) 
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Even if the Franco-German relations had cooled a bit since Holland’s election as 
French president, the harmonisation of EU policy proposals between the two coun-
tries did not come to a halt. As a matter of fact, the Paris-Berlin axis has been mak-
ing good use of its capacity to exert greater influence on the definition of the Euro-
pean “rules of game” than other Member States do. It is, however, not to be forgot-
ten that these two countries together provide more than 80 per cent of the first class 
guarantees (i.e. having real value for investors) covering EFSF rescue packages (see 
table 2). Stemming from their fundamental role in financing the euro crisis, France 
and Germany will no doubt continue to play a major role in shaping the future of 
the European integration. 
What has changed with the arrival of the left-wing govern-
ment? 
The growing costs of debt refinancing and the possible lowering of the country’s 
credit rating greatly decreased the room for manoeuvre of French economic policy 
as of the last quarter of 2011; a fact which could not be ignored or overlooked even 
by the new left-wing government. The latter, clever enough to keep election rhetoric 
but break election promises, decided to implement austerity packages worth €37 
billion in two steps: the first one (circa €7 billion) included measures, as part of an 
amended 2012 budget, targeting the wealthiest households and the biggest compa-
nies;11 the second one (€30 billion) was supposed to come true thanks to the gov-
ernment’s 2013 budget proposals. As a contrast to what had been decided and taken 
by the former government as commitments in their Stability Programme of 2012 – 
namely to make a fiscal consolidation effort of €115 billion between 2011 and 2016 
with two thirds coming from spending cuts and the rest from additional revenues – 
the 2013 budget intends to reverse this ratio by dropping the deficit to 3 per cent of 
the GDP with €20 billion in increased taxes on individuals and businesses, and with 
savings of €10 billion through a freeze in public expenditure.12  
In spite of all rhetoric of putting the burden of extra taxes on the well-off rather 
than the poor, life soon returned to normal. In November 2012 – based on the rec-
ommendations of a report prepared by a panel led by Louis Gallois, one of the 
country’s most prominent industrialists – the government introduced a payroll tax 
cut, aimed at easing high employment costs for companies by €20 billion a year 
from 2014 onwards.13 The tax credit will work out to a 6 per cent reduction in social 
security charges on workers on one up to 2.5 times the minimum wage and will be 
                                                 
11 L’Expansion – L’Express (web) 
12 See: Commission (2012): 9 and Ministry of Economy, Finances and Industry (France) (web) 50/58 
(ppt). 
13 Ministry of Economy, Finances and Industry (France) (web-a) 
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financed by €10 billion in spending cuts and another 10 billion of increase in value 
added tax (VAT) and green taxes.14  
Two months later, French employers’ groups and some of the main trade unions 
agreed on a deal to overhaul rigid labour rules, paving the way for new legislation 
in 2013 – an event so much anticipated by S&P that they threatened to cut France’s 
credit rating if reforms failed.15 The reform should help firms in their efforts to ad-
just to downturns in demand and reduce costs in the event of layoffs, while offering 
more job security to workers on short-term contracts. Two hard-line unions, how-
ever, the CGT and the FO, denounced the deal to be a backward step for workers’ 
rights as it contained the decrease of salaries in certain cases, primacy of individual 
collective agreements over cross-sector framework agreements, and the facilitation 
of forced mobility and of the firing of workers.16  
Similarly to internal economic policy matters, the latitude of the French govern-
ment in European policy-making is also circumscribed. Leaders of the left argue 
that uniform crisis management – i.e. fiscal austerity across Europe – implemented 
without paying attention to support economic growth leads to recession; the latter 
caused a strengthening of populist political parties in Southern Europe and a decline 
of solidarity in the North. This situation has to be changed and that is why people 
voted the left into power in France.17 
But it is only rhetoric. When it comes to policy proposals there is no change in 
the French approach. France calls for more solidarity towards the Mediterranean 
countries which is easily understandable given the enormous sovereign debt expo-
sure of its banking system to the region, exceeding by far that of Germany’s.18 
Hence the inclination of the French government to consider a partial debt mutualisa-
tion at European level to be a solution to the euro crisis, which would involve two 
things: Eurobonds and the European Central Bank (ECB) as lender of last resort. 
This idea is fiercely opposed by Germany, fearing it would endanger the ECB’s in-
dependence and in the end lead to higher inflation. For Berlin, solidarity of the rich 
regions of Europe toward the poor regions will only make sense once fiscal con-
solidation is achieved and fiscal discipline is strengthened.19      
Instead of conclusions 
France is a rich country with a lot of talents: increasing population, high-level pub-
lic services in the widest term of the word (healthcare, education, all sorts of infra-
                                                 
14 The standard rate of VAT will rise from 19.6 to 20 per cent as of 2014. The intermediate rate will 
rise from 7 to 10 per cent. The minimum rate, however, will be cut from 5.5 to 5.0 per cent. See: The 
Local (web). 
15 The Wall Street Journal (2012) 
16 For more details, see: Le Figaro (web). 
17 French Prime Minister (2012) 
18 The New York Times (2011) 
19 French Prime Minister (2012) and Stark (2011): 14-15. 
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structure), creative enterprises, dynamic intellectual life, etc. It is one of the world’s 
most popular destinations for tourism, and also one of the biggest exporters of agri-
cultural and food products, as well as of services. It ranks amongst the leaders in 
such future oriented sectors as energy, aeronautics, space, luxury and the pharma-
ceutical industry, as well as in network services. 
The space of the country’s development has, however, been steadily slowing 
down for several years now. Restructuring in the public sector is underway, but 
whether it will be deep enough to bring about the desired results in terms of budget 
balance without undermining solidarity and social cohesion, is to be seen. Neverthe-
less, experiences of the first couple of months of the left-wing power have shown 
how narrow the path the new government ought to follow… Market forces seem to 
prevail over any other considerations… 
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Abstract 
In this paper we illustrate why Germany seems to be more resistent to recent global 
financial and economic turmoil. In doing so we shed light on economic policy 
measures that were geared towards more resilience right before the crisis, and we 
also pinpoint how German consolidation resulted in a uniquely favourable position 
compared to other eurozone member states 
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The global financial crisis that started in 2008 manhandled the economy of most EU 
member states and resulted in strong crisis management and economic stimulating 
measures. From the spring of 2010 onwards, the probability of disintegration has 
been growing and the idea of the EU splitting up comed to the forefront from time 
to time. When examining the crisis, we have to underline the fact that the conse-
quences of crisis management and responses to the crisis are completely different 
within Europe and worldwide. However, the leading role of Germany is obvious; 
the recovery in Germany took place in a relatively short time, coupled with amend-
ing labour market performance. The reaction of the labour market to the 2008/2009 
crisis in Germany is so peculiar that it is worth revealing its causes in detail.  
Germany plays a key role in the future of the integration: a current example for 
that is the 12 September 2012 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
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(Bundesverfassungsgericht) that also defined the further fate of ESM.1 According to 
this decision, ESM and the fiscal pact can be inserted into the German legal system, 
the ratification process can move on (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2012), but the 
judges require certain minimal supplements before the treaty is ratified (Antpöhler, 
2012). A refusal could have had catastrophic effect on the eurozone and the future 
of the whole European Union. Another milestone and line of fracture at the same 
time: legal acts related to the banking union. In October 2012 an agreement was 
signed on direct banking supervision but Germany wants to avoid direct capital in-
jection to struggling banks (The Economist, 2012). This example well represents 
how German domestic politics and the elections in 2013 influence the whole future 
of European integration.  
1) What is the key to German success? 
To understand the current situation of Germany, and its key role in the euro area 
crisis management we have to look through reforms and fiscal processes in the 
2000s. The first years of the new millenium brought the reform of state allocation 
systems in Germany, coupled with the effect of world economic changes. Com-
pared to 2000, in the following two years there was a drop in GDP growth, and the 
pace of broadening of domestic demand was slower than that of growth, so growth 
remained export-led (Rácz, 2001). Persistent growth problems resulted in a growing 
number of unemployed and a worsening fiscal performance. So in this period the 
government was facing the problem of ameliorating the budgetary situation, pro-
ducing an over 2 per cent growth, and reducing the number of more than five mil-
lion unemployed (Rácz, 2005). 
ILO (2011) lists the current German employment situation as exemplary which 
proves the success of reforms although the relatively stable employment was real-
ised through decreasing working hours. One of the major drawbacks of this exem-
plary status is that the ratio of low income activities increased, which resulted in 
huge income inequalities. As a consequence of the lack of a generally defined 
minimum wage, hourly wages in several Eastern Länder (in the area of German 
Democratic Republic, DDR) are under 1 euro. The number of “working poor” in-
creased more dynamically in Germany than in the euro area altogether, although 
their average stayed below the eurozone average (Marsh – Hansen, 2012). What 
were the reform measures that led to this ambiguous labour market situation?  
From 2002 onwards, Germany was unable to respect the Stability and Growth 
Pact,2 budget deficit was over 3 per cent year after year, and the public debt rose 
                                                 
1 European Stability Mechanism – Created to achieve financial stability, substituting EFSF (Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility) and EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism), it expires in 
2013 (European Council, 2012a). 
2 There are three reasons for not punishing those big EU countries (among others France and Ger-
many) that did not respect the rules: (i) we are talking about the grandfathers of EU integration; (ii) 
these countries are motors of EU-wide growth, and the EDP might have decreased demand and 
caused recession; and (iii) it was an implicit way of acknowledging that trespassing the threshold 
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from 59.1 per cent in 2001 to 66.3 per cent in 2004. After the 2001 informal warn-
ing, in 2003 Germany was included in the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The 2004 
stability programme was reshaped several times since originally the government 
used a more favourable GDP growth number. On 14 March, 2003, the Schröder 
government launched the reform initiative entitled “Agenda 2010” that consisted of 
labour market, budgetary and sickness insurance reform, but further pensionary re-
forms were needed to complement this programme (Bundesregierung, 2003). In 
2007, more significant changes took place in the pension system: mandatory retire-
ment age was raised to 67 years. Further reforms were not accomplished but the 
prolonged crisis might put further political pressure on the pension system (Bonin, 
2009). 
“Agenda 2010” is the most comprehensive reform programme of Germany; the 
government set the basis of returning to growth and employment with comprehen-
sive structural reforms. Its fundamental aims were sustainability and stability in 
light of demographic processes, consolidation of the state budget, cutback on sub-
ventions, and reduction of bureaucracy. The long-term goal of these measures was 
to reach full employment. The “Agenda 2010” package comprised of employment 
measures initiated by the committee of Peter Hartz. Laws Hartz I. and II. entered 
into force on 1 January 2003, offering new employment possibilities, ameliorating 
recruitment agencies’ quality and pace, setting new orientation for professional 
trainings and strengthen the provider quality of the Federal Employment Agency. 
The third and fourth law aimed at converting the Federal Employment Agency into 
a performance- and client-oriented recruitment service, a more effective labour 
market policy, the simplification of labour market tools, setting new standards for 
employment safety of the elderly and new employment possibilities for the young, 
and the merger of social and unemployment benefits. The third and fourth Hartz law 
entered into force on 1 January 2004 and 2005, respectively. The above-mentioned 
four laws transformed connections between people looking for employment, em-
ployment agencies and employment providers, rewrote the rules of personal respon-
sibility and social welfare. Labour market reforms were complemented by impor-
tant labour law reforms, comprising of changing the Termination of Employment 
under German Law. Laws on partial employment and limited duration employment 
were signed to enhance recruitment, especially for smaller companies (Frey, 2006). 
Reforms brought mixed results: widening capacities for employment agencies, 
training programmes and wage subventions were successful, contrary to temporary 
public jobs and voucher systems for placement services and training measures 
which were relatively less auspicious (Miniszterelnöki Hivatal, 2010). For the un-
employment benefit, one had to prove having looked actively for a job, and a man-
datory „activity” period was set when the applicant had to participate in pro-
grammes helping to find employment. From this mandatory participation originates 
the obligation of accepting a so-called one-euro job that contributed to a growing 
ratio of the “working poor” (Mózer – Simonyi, 2011).  
                                                                                                                                        
does not necessarily imply problems – the structure of debt and factors of deficit growth are more 
relevant data.  
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Table 1 
Major macroeconomic indices 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 
GDP growth, percentage 3.3 1.1 -5.1 4.2 3.0 0.8 0.8 
Unemployment, percentage 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 5.9 5.5 5.6 
Investments, percentage of GDP 18.4 18.6 17.2 17.4 18.1 18.3 18.7 
General government deficit, percentage of GDP 0.2 -0.1 -3.2 -4.3 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
Public debt, percentage of GDP 65.2 66.7 74.4 83.0 81.2 83.0 n.a. 
Current account surplus, percentage of GDP 7.4 6.2 5.9 6.1 5.7 6.1 5.3 
Unit labour cost (2005=100) 97.2 99.4 105 103.8 105.3 108.3 109.9 
* Forecast. Note: source of governmental data: Deutsche Bank (2012); source of unemployment 
data; European Commission (2012a) 
Source: Eurostat  
 
 
Based on Germany’s 2007-11 updated stability programme (European Council, 
2008) we can establish that compared to the first part of decade, in 2006 and 2007 
German economic growth was a lot more robust, over 3 per cent. The stabilising 
measures and the unexpected real economic effects of the escalating crisis in 2008 
resulted in a downward movement of real GDP growth from 3.3 per cent in 2007 to 
around 1 per cent in 2008, followed by a 5.2 per cent decrease in GDP in 2009 (see 
table 1). In 2010, the economy was revived, but 2012 only produced minimal GDP 
growth, and Eurostat forecasts 0.8 per cent GDP growth for 2013. The exit from the 
recession brought a reduced unemployment rate, which is an unprecedented phe-
nomenon in the EU for that period (see figure 1). 
Competitiveness has been restored by wage restraint and structural reforms. 
While employment has been increased, real wages have been continuously reduced 
as a consequence of the cuts at the unemployment benefits and the increasing share 
of part-time employment. Economic prosperity helped the completion of the re-
forms to offset the negative effects. The positive developments of the labour market 
supports the forecast on the improving domestic demand, however, external demand 
is expected to weaken. Additional positive effects have been created by the improv-
ing innovation performance and the efficiency gains arising from the simplification 
of taxation.  
 
Ágnes Orosz 32 
Figure 1 
German labour market outlook in European perspective 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2012) 
x axis: : change in unemployment rate Aug 07–Aug 12 
y axis: real GDP growth Q2 07–Q2 12  
 
 
A steady decline in unemployment can be observed since 2007, reaching 5.9 per 
cent in 2011 resulting in the rising number of people paying into the social security 
system. As an outstanding feature of the German labour market, the unemployment 
rate decreased in 2012, and would remain stable in 2013 as well.  
Table 1 shows us that before the crisis Unit Labour Cost (ULC) for Germany 
slightly increased (base year is 2005) and afterwards the growth rate of ULC has 
been one of the lowest for Germany. According to Felipe and Kumar (2011) unit 
labour costs have increased in all countries without exception within the eurozone, 
in some cases by a factor of 15 (e.g., Greece). The lowest increases were registered 
by Germany and the Netherlands for the period of 1980 to 2007, it can be inter-
preted as a competitiveness gain for Germany compared to the other eurozone 
member states. Real wage growth in Germany has lagged behind labour productiv-
ity growth through the analysed period. For the periphery of the eurozone the intro-
duction of the euro resulted in an increasing current account deficit and worsening 
price and wage competitiveness, while the core countries – especially Germany – 
could improve their current account position and competitiveness (Watt, 2012). 
Growth in 2011 was driven mainly by domestic demand; in 2012 the key driving 
force of growth was both consumption and exports when the German GDP re-
bounded, and the contribution of gross fixed capital formation was negative (see 
table 2). Germany has a significant trade surplus; however uncertain external envi-
ronment is increasingly expected to take a toll on exports (European Commission, 
2012a). Current account surplus is outstanding, since 2007 it was about 6 per cent 
of the GDP each year. One dimension of the growing imbalances among the EU 
member states is manifested in their significant and persistent divergence of the cur-
rent accounts and net external positions. Besides Germany, other surplus countries 
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in the eurozone3 are the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Austria and Luxembourg 
(European Commission, 2012b). 
 
Table 2 
Contribution to GDP growth 
(annual percentage change) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 
Domestic demand  1.2 -1.5 1.9 2.2 0.6 1.1 
Inventories 0.0 -0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 
Net exports -0.1 -2.8 1.7 0.6 0.7 -0.2 
GDP 1.1 -5.1 4.2 3.0 0.8 0.8 
* Forecast 
Source: European Commission (2012a): 60  
 
 
Germany is a prime example for successful budgetary consolidation, in which 
the main fiscal consolidation efforts focused on the expenditure side. In order to en-
sure long-term sustainability, promoting growth and improving employment cir-
cumstances have been on the agenda as well as the cuts of public expenditures.  
The consolidation scenario for 2007-2011 was rewritten by the outbreak of the 
crisis. Gross public debt amounted to 65 per cent of GDP in 2007, and after a dra-
matic increase it reached 83 per cent in 2010.4 The excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) for Germany was opened in December 2009, general government deficit and 
general government gross debt were above the threshold (3.7 per cent and 74.2 per 
cent of GDP respectively). To bring its deficit back below the 3 per cent of the GDP 
threshold, Germany made the fiscal effort of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP on average 
annually over the 2011-13 period (Council of the European Union, 2012). By 2011, 
the country could manage to stabilise its public finances, and in 2012 the Council 
adopted a decision of closing the EDP for Germany.  
German labour market developments contributed to the unique crisis responses; 
this period is often cited as the “new German economic miracle,”5 which was ac-
companied by successful fiscal consolidation. Several reasons are able to explain 
this unusual response of Germany. First, the economic crisis mostly hit financially 
strong companies that were able to impelement working-time flexibility instru-
ments. Second, in the years prior to the recession, Germany had introduced com-
prehensive labour market reforms to improve efficiency. Third, demographic chal-
lenges were maintained as well, policy-makers payed special attention to the labour 
market (Caliendo – Hogenacker, 2012). Recent reforms of the pensions system, es-
pecially the reform in 2007 contributed to the further increase of the labour market 
participation of older workers. There are two channels through which the pension 
                                                 
3 Outside the monetary union, Denmark and Sweden ran important surpluses as well. 
4 In 2007 the fulfilment of the Maastricht criterion on debt was targeted by 2010. The dramatic effect 
of the crisis can be demonstrated by the counter-movements of debt trends.  
5 The phrase “economic miracle” relates to Germany’s economic performance at time of the 
2008/2009 crisis (Bonin, 2012; Caliendo–Hogenacker, 2012; Rinne–Zimmermann, 2012).  
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system has been able to build up reserves to be resilient to the weakened economic 
conditions: growing revenues as a consequence of improving labour market per-
formance, and decreasing expenses because of strict regulations and the increase of 
the statutory retirement age to 67 years (Bonin, 2009). 
2) Crisis management in Germany 
In the case of Germany, the crisis was transmitted through both trade and finance 
channels. External demand for German goods and services shrank considerably, abd 
they resulted in a significant, (on an annual basis) nearly 7 per cent GDP loss, 
higher than in most other advanced economies. Despite the dramatic effects on the 
GDP, the German labour market has performed exceptionally well. The finance 
channel has contributed to the crisis, when the sub-prime market in the United 
States crashed in the summer of 2007, and various German banks, including state-
owned banks that had heavily invested in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), 
suffered significant financial losses.  
The dramatic decline of the GDP changed in Q1 2010 when the growth rate 
turned positive, and the stable employment supported domestic demand did not to 
decline. It is remarkable that within the European Union the only country in which 
the employment rate grew from 2008 to 2009 was Germany.6 
In 2008 Germany defined its main fields of responses to the financial crisis as 
follows: (1) short-term stabilisation, long-term reforms; (2) good framework for 
stimulating trust within the economy; (3) maintaining public finances to support 
economic growth; (4) restructuring the labour market; (5) increasing the efficiency 
of the social insurance system; (6) rationalisation of the energy policy; (7) support-
ing innovation in order to improve competitiveness; and finally, (8) improving 
Germany’s position on the global market through international and European eco-
nomic policy actions (Kőrösi, 2011). 
In accordance with the global trend in 2008, the Federal Parliament of Germany 
passed a law to stabilise the financial markets, namely Finanzmarktstabilisierungs-
gesetz (2008). A €400 billion financial market stabilisation fund was set up based 
on this legislation and another €80 billion was added to recapitalise the banking sec-
tor. The aims of these credit guarantee and credit expansion measures were to main-
tain interbank lending, avoid bankruptcy of banks and ensure the availability of 
credit for businesses. In 2009 the German government established €80 billion fund 
(Wirtschaftsfonds Deutschland) for credit guarantees and support for German en-
terprises (ILO, 2011).  
Beside maintaining financial stability and boosting credit supply, Germany an-
nounced three stimulus packages in order to ease the negative consequences of the 
crisis between November 2008 and December 2009. The first announced stimulus 
package (FSP I, 2008) of €50 billion was entitled “Pact for employment security 
through enhanced growth” (Beschäftigungssicherung durch Wachstumsstärkung) 
                                                 
6 Based on Eurostat data.  
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with the aim of saving or creating 500,000 jobs. The second stimulus package (FSP 
II, 2009) with the same amount as the first was entitled “Pact for employment and 
stability in Germany” (Pakt für Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland) and it 
contained a mix of tax cuts, different support for companies and investments into in-
frastructure and education. The third stimulus package (FSP III, 2009) “Law on the 
Acceleration of Economic Growth” (Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz) amounted 
for €22 billion and was related to tax reliefs for enterprises and individuals.  
On the one hand, the fiscal stimulus packages had a significant impact; they have 
been estimated to represent around 4 per cent of 2008 GDP, Germany being ranked 
in the middle among the G20 economies (ILO, 2011). On the other hand, in the case 
of Germany the effects ofautomatic stabilisers were rather salient, and they 
amounted to around 2.5 per cent of the 2009 and 2010 GDP (ILO, 2010). 
Germany has been the most devoted advocator of rules-based fiscal policy for 
long. In 2009, Germany incorporated a debt brake into its constitution and intro-
duced a sizeable package in order to cut back the structural deficit constantly until 
reaching the target of 0.35 per cent of GDP from 2016 onwards. The federal budget 
for 2011 was already prepared to comply with the new regulations. The inclusion of 
the debt brake as an effectively strict limit on the sovereign debt in Germany’s Con-
stitution can be understood as a tool to enhance the country’s credibility on the fi-
nancial markets, leading to lower risk premiums (Truger – Will, 2012). A special 
feature of the German regulation is that it is even stricter than the provision of the 
Stability and Growth Pact for balanced budget rule with a lower limit of a structural 
deficit of 0.5 per cent of the GDP (Benczes – Váradi, 2011). Germany’s debt brake 
is an intelligent and promising concept for achieving a long-term reduction in public 
debt. The main advantage of the debt brake is that it has both the structural and the 
cyclical deficit components, the fiscal targets are dynamic; therefore, the debt brake 
could easily be extended to other countries. The introduced debt brake can be un-
derstood as Germany’s first step towards growth-oriented consolidation. Germany’s 
benchmark role on the capital markets is unambiguous; other eurozone countries 
could soon decide to take similar steps (Heinen, 2010). 
Besides strict fiscal consolidation measures and a rules-based fiscal policy, the 
specific feature of the German crisis management is that the country has been able 
to maintain high living standards for its citizens. Germany has sustained the pre-
crisis level of domestic demand while using automatic stabilisers to lessen the nega-
tive social impacts of the crisis. Since 2009 almost all categories of social insur-
ance7 spending have witnessed significant year-on-year increases in spending, rang-
ing from 2.2 per cent in pensions (€5.4 billion) to more than 37 per cent on unem-
ployment benefits (€10 billion) (ILO, 2011). This mechanism ensures that with a 
higher economic growth social expenditures can be reduced, despite the fragile eco-
nomic circumstances, especially at a time of crisis when targeted social policies are 
required to counterbalance the negative consequences.  
 
                                                 
7 With the exception of accident insurance. 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite major parts of the eurozone living through a period of severe fiscal auster-
ity, as a consequence of the successful fiscal consolidation and the crisis manage-
ment measures, Germany has manoeuvred itself into a favourable position within 
the EU.  
The “new German economic miracle” is the consequence of the labour market 
developments accompanied by a successful fiscal consolidation. Admittedly, the 
German situation is extremely unique, yet the following factors lie behind its suc-
cess: (1) the economic crisis mostly hit financially strong companies that were able 
to implement working-time flexibility instruments; (2) Germany had introduced 
comprehensive labour market reforms to improve efficiency already years before 
the recession; and (3) demographic challenges were maintained as well, with pol-
icy-makers paying special attention to the labour market. The examplary features 
are obvious; however, these special institutional factors cannot be copied to be im-
plemented anywhere else.  
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Abstract 
Intuitively, some authors could consider that the current crisis seems to affect con-
vergence in the EU. On the contrary, our analysis shall demonstrate that on the 
long run the convergence process is not essentially altered. Depending on the 
evaluation methodology, the indicators used and the periods considered, the results 
of studies on convergence are often ambiguous. By using the Lorenz curve model 
and its attached Gini coefficients or variation coefficient, our study shows that dur-
ing the last decade there was a significant convergence in the EU despite the nega-
tive impact of the actual crisis on growth rate. However, differences in the matter of 
convergence still exist within the groups of countries. Thus, generally while in the 
EU-10 (last adhered countries to the EU) is manifesting a strong convergence, in 
the EU-15 (old members of the EU) a significant trend of divergence was demon-
strated. 
Keywords: convergence, Gini coefficient, Lorenz curve, variation coefficient, 
divergence 
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1) Introduction 
Convergence theory and empirical evidences show a general convergence trend as a 
long-term process during the economic development. Also in the history of the EU 
there is significant progress in the matter of convergence. However, convergence is 
not linear; there are periods of acceleration and periods of braking, due to a number 
of specific conditions. 
Following the Sollow model (Solow, 1956), real convergence in the EU refers 
explicitely to the income per inhabitant or to the level of productivity per employed 
person. Also, taking into account the contemporary globalisation phenomenon we 
analyse convergence in the EU regarding export and import per capita. Moreover, 
on the structural convergence side we estimate some indicators reflecting changes 
in the share of main sectors in total employment. 
2) Empirical evidences  
Despite efforts to achieve 
convergence in the EU, there 
are still significant 
discrepancies today among 
countries regarding GDP per 
capita. As empirical 
evidence, we are presenting 
in figure 1 the 2011 spatial 
distribution of GDP per 
inhabitant in EU, where LO 
means longitude (on the left 
side relating to the origin, 0 
meridian, the Western 
longitude, as it is marked 
usually on geographical 
maps, is changed into 
negative values), LA – 
latitude, and y – GDP per 
inhabitant in purchasing 
power standard. The 
purchasing power standard, 
denoted as PPS, is an 
artificial currency unit (PPS 
is the technical term used by 
Eurostat for the common 
currency in which national 
accounts aggregates are 
Figure 1 
Spatial distribution of GDP per capita in the EU, 
in 2011 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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expressed when adjusted for price level differences using PPPs; PPP being 
Purchasing power parity). Beside the three-dimensional picture is its attached 
“geodesic” map (or the so-called contour plot). We excluded from the graphical 
representation of figure 1 two island states (Malta and Cyprus) and Luxembourg 
due to its high level of GDP per inhabitant (273 per cent comparing to the EU 
average level). 
On such a stylised map of the EU, the proportions of an actual geographical map 
were kept in the longitude and latitude dimensions. As in the case of a geographical 
map, light colours correspond to high lands and dark colours to abyssal zones. We 
consider that the advantage of such maps is that the transition from one country to 
another or from one region to another is smooth and not abrupt, unlike in the  case 
of using a map with a limited number of colours (as the conventional borders could 
block the transition of economic factors, economic phenomena and processes com-
mon between neighbouring geographic areas, which is unlike reality, especially in 
the actual situation of the disappearance of borders, as is the case in the European 
Union. Also, in the case of the spatial representation of distributions (3D images 
usually shown on the left side of the figures) we selected the best perspective by 
allowing for some rotation (both horizontally and vertically) of the image, thus 
changing the resolution. 
Figure 2 
Spatial distribution of export and import per capita in the EU, in 2011 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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Usually, synthetic indicators of foreign trade development are considered exports 
and imports per capita (expressed in thousand PPS). Their distributions in the EU in 
2011 are shown in figure 2 (where, for reasons of image enhancement, again two 
island countries, Cyprus and Malta, and respectively Luxembourg, due to its too 
large level, were excluded). 
Differences among countries in the EU area are really impressive on the two in-
dicators of trade intensity per capita (expressed in PPS), values ranging from 4,700 
to 5,100 in Romania and Greece, up to 33,700 and 117,700 in Ireland and Luxem-
bourg for export, and for import from 5,300 to 6,700 in Romania and Greece, up to 
26,800 in Ireland and 96,600 in Luxembourg. 
Unlike the distribution of per capita indicators in the EU, in the case of the share 
of export and the share of import in GDP, the distributions are very different. Ac-
cording to graphs in figure 3, we can see high levels (areas marked with light col-
ours) also in the eastern part of the EU. For example, in some developed countries 
such as England, France and Italy, in 2011 there were lower values of respective 
weights than in countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. This 
is because, on the one hand, the levels of GDP per capita of those Eastern countries 
are lower than those of the Western countries, and, on the other hand, the fact that a 
high foreign trade enables faster economic growth which may reduce future gaps 
still existing today in terms of overall development. 
Figure 3 
Spatial distribution of the share of export and import in GDP in the EU, in 2011 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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3) Trends in convergence in the EU between                               
2000 and 2011 
In order to evaluate the convergence process in the EU during the last decade we 
used some concentration indicators, such as the Lorenz curve (developed by Max O. 
Lorenz in 1905), its attached Gini coefficients and variation coefficient. Changes in 
the degree of concentration during a period could be the measure of convergence. 
For instance, in figure 3 the Lorenz curve for the EU in 2000 and in 2011 is pre-
sented (where the cumulated weight of countries, i=1,...27, in GDP, Yc%, on the 
ordinate and those of population, Pc%, on abscissa are expressed as percentages). 
We can see a smaller area marked by the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line in 2011 
(noted as year 11) compared to 2000 (noted as year 0) that represents a trend of 
convergence in this period. 
Figure 4 
The Lorenz curve in the case of GDP distribution on the EU, in 2000 and 2011 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
 
For instance, in 2011, the Lorenz curve shows that 25 per cent of the EU popula-
tion (the poorest 14 countries with a GDP per capita less than 23,000 PPS) covered 
only 16.5 per cent of the total EU GDP, whereas 20 per cent of the EU population 
(the poorest 9 countries with a GDP per capita of less than 19,400 PPS) covered 
only 12.4 per cent of the total EU GDP. 
In table 1 our estimates for the two indicators of convergence (the Gini coeffi-
cient estimated by the trapezoid method and variation coefficient), in the period of 
2000-2011, and the average level of GDP per capita in PPS are presented.  
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Table 1 
Convergence in GDP per inhabitant in the EU, 2000-2011 
 
Year 
Gini Coefficient Variation Coefficient 
GDP per capita  (in PPS) 
- in % - 
2000 15.794 26.208 19356 
2001 15.314 25.458 20072 
2002 14.954 24.208 20736 
2003 14.584 22.970 21032 
2004 14.482 22.179 22001 
2005 14.175 21.622 22855 
2006 13.605 20.831 24053 
2007 12.891 19.774 25393 
2008 12.223 18.506 25426 
2009 11.718 17.680 23878 
2010 12.322 18.135 24875 
2011 12.161 17.998 25544 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
 
During the considered period, we can see, as a general rule, a significant diminu-
tion in value of the convergence indicators, which means a trend of higher concen-
tration inside the EU. Thus, between 2000 and 2011, the Gini coefficient was re-
duced by 23.0 per cent and the variation coefficient by 31.3 per cent. At the same 
time, GDP per capita increased by 32.0 per cent. However, during the last part of 
the investigated period the impact of the actual crisis was materialised in the cessa-
tion of the convergence process, which is reflected by the higher values of the two 
indicators in 2010 and 2011 than those in 2009.  
At the level of the EU similar results were obtained when analysing the conver-
gence regarding the export per capita and import per capita for the period of 2000-
2011. However, significant differences occur when we analyse the convergence 
process inside certain groups of countries in the EU. This is the case when EU 
countries (excluding two island states, Cyprus and Malta) are split into two groups: 
(1) the old EU countries, those who were members already before the last wave of 
enlargement between 2004 and 2007, the so-called EU-15 group (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK); and (2) the former communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the so-called EU-10 group (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia). 
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4) Discrepancies between the EU-10 and the EU-15 
Before comparing indicators of convergence between the two groups of countries, 
one needs to evaluate the degree of concentration within those groups. Thus, 
applying the same methodology as to the level of EU (EU-27), we estimated the 
values of convergence indicators for the two groups of countries in the period of 
2000-2011. The results of our estimating procedure for the GDP per capita 
expressed in PPS, in the period of 2000-2011, are summarized in table 2 for the EU-
10 and in table 3 for the EU-15, respectively. 
Table 2 
Convergence in GDP per inhabitant in the EU-10, 2000-2011 
 
Year 
Gini Coefficient Variation Coefficient 
GDP per capita  (in PPS) 
- in % - 
2000 17.098 25.582 8606 
2001 16.969 23.963 9122 
2002 16.333 23.202 9696 
2003 15.787 21.106 10243 
2004 14.675 19.809 11102 
2005 14.437 19.478 11784 
2006 13.240 18.528 12764 
2007 12.446 16.915 14114 
2008 10.571 14.766 14787 
2009 10.539 15.091 14238 
2010 10.007 15.451 14895 
2011 9.268 14.443 15772 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
Table 3 
Divergence in GDP per inhabitant in the EU-15, 2000-2011 
 
Year 
Gini coefficient Variation coefficient 
GDP per capita  (in PPS) 
- in % - 
2000 4.876 6.655 22351 
2001 4.615 6.377 23103 
2002 4.651 6.855 23774 
2003 4.827 6.441 23951 
2004 5.363 7.071 24931 
2005 5.324 7.353 25807 
2006 5.096 6.842 27042 
2007 4.919 6.611 28355 
2008 4.862 6.350 28198 
2009 4.613 6.255 26379 
2010 5.662 8.032 27457 
2011 6.179 8.727 28062 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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Generally, we can see a strong convergence process inside the EU-10 group, 
contrary to a divergence process inside the EU-15. In the case of the EU-10 the ac-
tual crisis does not affect the convergence trend, but in that of the EU-15 it pro-
voked a divergence tendency after 2009.  
While in the group of less developed countries (EU-10) a significant decrease 
was registered in the value of the selected indicators (-45.8 per cent for the Gini 
coefficient and -43.5 per cent for the variation coefficient, respectively), which 
means increasing concentration and hence the existence of an intense process of 
convergence, in the case of the developed countries (EU-15) an accentuated 
decrease was registered in the degree of concentration, thus a process of divergence, 
reflected by the increase in the value of the selected indicators (+26.7 per cent for 
the Gini coefficient and +31.1 per cent for the variation coefficient, respectively). 
Although during the period under review within the group EU-10 the degree of 
concentration increased in contrast with a decrease of concentration inside the EU-
15, the gap between the two groups of countries, although down from 2000, was 
still significant at the 2011 level: 3.1 percentage points (12.2 percentage points in 
2000) in the case of the Gini coefficient and 5.7 percentage points (12.3 percentage 
points in 2000) in the case of the variation coefficient, respectively.  
At the EU level, convergence tendency is better reflected in the graph of figure 5 
(where yUE10% and yUE15% are percentage deviations from the EU average in 
both groups of countries). Between the two groups of countries we can see large 
differences regarding GDP per capita. Thus, in 2000 this indicator for the EU-10 
represented only 44.5 per cent of the EU average, compared with 115.5 per cent for 
the EU-15. However, in the last decade, there was a significant process of 
convergence between the two groups of countries, so that in 2011 the GDP per 
capita in the EU-10 has grown to represent 61.7 per cent of the EU average, 
compared to 109.9 per cent for the EU-15. 
Figure 5 
Trends in GDP per inhabitant in the EU-10 and the EU-15, 2000-2011 
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 Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
 
Moreover, regarding the correlation between convergence indicators and the 
level of GDP per capita there is a significant difference between the two groups of 
countries. Thus, while inside the EU-10 the convergence process was positively in-
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fluenced by the growth of average GDP per capita, inside the EU-15 the growth of 
average GDP per capita was accompanied by a process of divergence. 
Thus, for the EU-10 there was a strong negative correlation between the average 
GDP per capita and the value of convergence indicators (the correlation coefficient 
was -0.986 in the case of the Gini coefficient and -0.983 in the case of the variation 
coefficient, respectively). By contrast, for the EU-15 during the considered period, 
there was a positive correlation between the average GDP per capita and the value 
of convergence indicators (the correlation coefficient was +0.480 in the case of the 
Gini coefficient and +0.376 in the case of the variation coefficient, respectively). 
Regarding the analysis of convergence in the matter of export per capita, by 
applying the same methodology we estimated the values of convergence indicators 
for the two groups of countries in the period of 2000-2011. The results are 
summarised in table 4 (where as a convergence indicator we included only the 
variation coefficient). 
As in the case of GDP per capita, we can see a strong convergence process inside 
the EU-10 group, contrary to a divergence process inside the EU-15. Generally, the 
actual crisis does not seem to significantly influence the previous tendencies.  
While in the group of less developed countries (EU-10) a significant decrease 
was registered in the value of the variation coefficient (-30.8 per cent), which means 
increasing concentration and hence the existence of an intense process of conver-
gence, in the case of the developed countries (EU-15) an accentuated decrease was 
registered in the degree of concentration, thus a process of divergence, reflected by 
the increase in the value of the variation coefficient (+37.7 per cent). Moreover, 
since 2009 the absolute value of the variation coefficient in the case of the EU-10 is 
less than its value for the EU-15, meaning a higher degree of concentration inside 
the group of Eastern countries than that of Western countries. This reversal of 
trends is probably a result of the global crisis, which seems to have seriously 
affected the foreign trade in the case of the EU-15, compared to the EU-10 
countries.  
Table 4 
Convergence and divergence in export per inhabitant in EU, 2000-2011 
 
Year 
Variation coefficient 
(in %) 
Export per capita 
(in PPS) 
EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 
2000 57.306 31.289 3865 7874 
2001 58.467 29.896 4143 8117 
2002 52.794 31.785 4301 8179 
2003 48.344 33.028 4747 8006 
2004 44.510 35.826 5446 8630 
2005 48.690 37.452 5785 9290 
2006 47.366 38.530 6822 10334 
2007 47.655 40.948 7515 10995 
2008 45.276 41.601 7722 11207 
2009 39.796 41.240 6945 9301 
2010 40.121 42.896 8165 10707 
2011 39.679 43.077 9358 11699 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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By groups of countries, there is a tendency to approximate the value of exports 
per capita. Thus, in the period under review, exports per capita relative to the EU 
average for the EU-10 increased from 55.1 per cent in 2000 to 80.1 per cent in 
2011, while for the EU-15 this figure fell from 112.3 per cent in 2000 to 104.2 per 
cent in 2011. 
Based on the analysis of the period of 2000-2011, it is noteworthy that there are 
opposite signs of the correlation between the variation coefficient and the value of 
exports per capita in the case of the two groups of countries. Thus, while in the case 
of the EU-10 there is a significant negative correlation between the per capita 
export and the coefficient of variation (-0.836), for the EU-15 it is strongly positive 
(+0.910). Therefore, we can say that for the EU-10 an increasing export value per 
capita is an important stimulus for convergence, while for the EU-15 it almost 
automatically leads to divergence. 
5) Convergence in structural changes in the EU-10 and in 
the EU-15 
As indicator to evaluate structural convergence in the EU we used the variation 
coefficient estimated for the share of services in employment, during the period of 
2000-2011. From data in table 5, we can see a higher degree of concentration inside 
the EU-15 than inside the EU-10, expressed by smaller values of the variation 
coefficient (more than double in the EU-10 than in the EU-15 group). During the 
investigated period, there was a tendency of rapprochement between the two groups 
of countries, as the gap in terms of the average share of services in employment 
compared to the EU average level decreased significantly.  
Table 5 
Convergence in the matter of share of services in employment in EU, 2000-2011 
(%) 
 
Year 
Variation coefficient Share of services in employment 
EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 
2000 18.057 6.896 45.582 70.644 
2001 18.916 6.791 47.331 71.088 
2002 14.577 6.736 49.694 71.680 
2003 15.186 6.698 50.259 72.198 
2004 13.078 6.561 51.126 72.722 
2005 12.712 6.438 51.642 73.080 
2006 11.926 6.275 52.564 73.433 
2007 11.923 6.217 52.893 73.634 
2008 11.482 5.966 53.175 74.060 
2009 11.857 5.500 54.504 74.914 
2010 12.471 5.263 55.275 75.539 
2011 12.580 5.203 55.122 75.932 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
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Thus, while the share of services in employment inside the EU-10 increased by 
almost ten percentage points (from 45.6 per cent in 2000 to 55.1 per cent in 2011), 
inside the EU-15 it increased only by slightly over five percentage points (from 70.6 
per cent in 2000 to 75.9 per cent in 2011). We can conclude that in the period of 
2000-2011 a clear convergence process was registered in both groups of contries. 
Conclusions 
During the last decade a convergence trend was manifested inside the EU. How-
ever, despite various efforts significant discrepancies still exist among the countries 
regarding GDP per capita. Moreover, differences among countries in the EU are 
impressive regarding trade intensity per capita (expressed in PPS), values ranging in 
2011 from 4700 to 5100 in Romania and Greece, up to 33700 and 117700 in Ireland 
and Luxembourg for export, and from 5300 to 6700 in Romania and Greece, up to 
26800 in Ireland and 96600 in Luxembourg for import. 
Between the two groups of countries, the EU-10 and the EU-15, we can see large 
differences in the matter of GDP per capita. Thus, in 2000 this indicator for the EU-
10 represented only 44.5 per cent of the EU average, compared with 115.5 per cent 
for the EU-15. However, in the last decade, there was a significant process of 
convergence between the two groups of countries, so that in 2011 the GDP per 
capita in the EU-10 has grown to represent 61.7 per cent of the EU average, 
compared to 109.9 per cent for the EU-15. 
The impact of the actual crisis was stopping the convergence process, which is 
reflected by the higher values of the selected indicators (meaning a decrease in con-
centration inside the EU) in 2010 and 2011 than those in 2009. 
Generally, in the matter of GDP per capita there was a strong convergence proc-
ess inside the EU-10, contrary to a divergence process inside the EU-15. In the case 
of the EU-10 the actual crisis did not affect the convergence trend, but in that of the 
EU-15 it provoked a divergence tendency after 2009.  
As in the case of GDP per capita, there was a strong convergence process inside 
the EU-10 for export per capita, contrary to a divergence process inside the EU-15. 
After 2008, the absolute value of the variation coefficient in the case of the EU-
10 is less than its value for the EU-15, meaning a higher degree of concentration 
inside the group of Eastern countries than the group of Western countries. This re-
versal of trends is probably a result of the global crisis, which seems to affect the 
foreign trade of the EU-15 more than the EU-10 countries. 
There are significant differences in the EU regarding structural convergence. For 
instance, the share of services in employment inside the EU-10 increased in the 
period of 2000-2011 by almost ten percentage points, while inside the EU-15 it 
increased only slightly over five percentage points. However, we can conclude that 
in the period of 2000-2011 a clear convergence process can be registered in both 
groups of countries. 
     
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IMPACTS OF EU ACCESSION ON THE HUNGARIAN 
AND ROMANIAN AGRICULTURES

 
 
Judit Kiss
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Introduction 
Though, in historical terms, only some years have passed since Hungary’s accession 
to the EU in 2004, let alone Romania’s joining in 2007, it might be instructive to 
draw the preliminary balance of accession. Especially in the case of agriculture, 
which was one of the most hotly debated and negotiated parts of Eastern 
enlargement. This debate is going to be continued in the course of the adaptation of 
the new Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. 
Furthermore, agriculture is still an important sector of the economy both for 
Hungary and Romania. Though agriculture gave only 3.53 per cent of the GDP in 
Hungary in 2010 and 7.14 per cent of the GDP in Romania (Csáki-Jámbor, 2012), 
this sector employed 5.5 per cent of the workforce in Hungary and 19.1 per cent (!) 
in Romania.1 In Hungary 27.4 per cent of household expenditure is spent on food 
consumption, while in Romania 32.7 per cent. Both countries are significant 
agricultural exporters and basically rural societies2 due to their outstanding agro-
potential, high share of agricultural land3 and abundance of labour force. However, 
                                                          
 A paper presented at the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop “Eurozone crisis, member states 
interests, economic dilemmas” held on 30 November, 2012 at IWE 1122 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. 
 Dr. Judit Kiss is professor emeritus at Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Institute of World Economics (IWE) 
1 It is interesting to note that in Romania 1.7 million people were engaged in the agricultural sector, 
0.4 million more than in the USA agriculture. 
2 In Romania 46 per cent of active population lives in rural areas and 60 per cent of rural population 
is employed in agriculture (Kerekes, 2010). 
3 In Romania 61.8 per cent of the total territory is agricultural land (Kerekes, 2010). 
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their agricultures suffer from the scarcity of capital, ageing agricultural labour 
force4 and should cope with low productivity and competitiveness. 
An in-depth assessment of accession is all the more indispensable as the new 
member states (NMS) had high expectations concerning accession, especially in the 
case of agriculture. They hoped to: 
 get free and unlimited access to the enlarged single market of 500 million 
customers; 
 enjoy the relatively stable and high agricultural prices; 
 benefit from the intervention and the export refund systems of the Common 
Agricultural Policy; and 
 get access to direct payments and various rural development measures. 
The main aim of the paper is to analyse and compare the impact of agricultural 
accession on the two neighbouring new member countries (Hungary and Romania) 
with special regard to agricultural production, employment, income and foreign 
trade in agricultural goods. 
1) Agricultural production performance 
The first issue to be analysed is whether agricultural production has increased after 
the accession. As Hungary’s and Romania’s agricultural production is dominated by 
crop production to a degree of 65 per cent and 75 per cent (2011), respectively,5 due 
to the high share of arable land, we start our analysis with crop production.  
As it can be seen from table 1 the value of crop production increased in the first 
years of the accession (2004, 2005 and 2007, 2008, respectively), then it dropped in 
2009 and recovered in 2010 and 2011. As a consequence the share of the NMS in 
the EU-27 crop production increased from around 10 per cent in 2000 to 19.2 per 
cent in 2011. The main factors behind the increasing tendency for crop production 
are: 
 increasing producer prices: in the case of Hungary by 2010 the crop producer 
price indices increased to 163.3 compared to 2005 in nominal terms and to 125.9 
in real terms (the same figures for Romania were 161.1, and 119.2, respectively) 
(Agriculture in the European Union.... 2011); 
 volume increase due to higher yields6 as the land area was stagnating; 
 increasing land and labour productivity as the labour input decreased; and 
 economic incentives provided to crop producers by the EU support system in the 
framework of the SAPS. 
                                                          
4 In Hungary 55 per cent of the farmers are above the age of 55, while in Romania 67.5 per cent. 
5 The new member states’ average was 58.5 per cent in 2010 (Farming structure and accounts...). 
6 In the case of cereals the Hungarian yields increased 35 per cent from 2000-2003 to 2004-2007 
(Csáki-Jámbor, 2009). 
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Table 1  
Crop output 
 (Production value at basic price - million EUR) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27  168855.0  174359.7  173798.7  176310.7  189092.6  169479.3  168625.3  192177.7  201163.8  173473.5  187428.5  204944.6  
Bulgaria  1304.7  1515.4  1667.6  1628.8  1762.7  1627.5  1757.8  1565.8  2489.5  2012.6  2039.8  2542.0  
Czech Rep. 1397.9  1623.9  1653.1  1379.4  1975.8  1677.6  1746.0  2391.5  2505.8  1931.1  2162.4  2856.4  
Estonia  150.0  156.7  182.8  165.5  167.3  204.5  211.0  336.2  249.7  226.5  255.0  336.3  
Cyprus  0.0  0.0  0.0  288.0  312.7  326.0  320.6  327.4  304.5  312.0  331.1  342.4  
Latvia  198.7  226.6  257.5  264.7  308.2  346.0  384.8  525.3  529.7  434.9  470.4  549.6  
Lithuania  634.4  572.0  625.3  676.9  681.8  792.1  703.3  1147.0  1238.4  1004.7  1017.2  1452.9  
Hungary  2404.1  2679.4  2827.7  2772.5  3804.5  3315.9  3333.0  3896.1  4655.5  3232.7  3799.5  4676.3  
Malta  48.8  52.0  50.5  43.2  44.5  43.6  45.3  48.0  52.7  51.3  50.1  51.4  
Poland  6059.3  7163.7  6394.7  5758.0  7399.7  6973.7  7810.7  10399.2  11539.0  8643.8  9800.7  11964.3  
Romania  4974.7  6722.7  5783.2  6902.4  9404.4  7721.6  8885.1  8612.0  12421.2  8428.4  10154.6  12781.0  
Slovenia  464.0  431.1  534.4  431.4  572.2  530.8  517.1  598.9  600.1  547.2  576.2  678.8  
Slovakia  462.2  665.3  660.0  629.7  954.3  752.7  792.9  951.3  1108.5  850.6  929.7  1202.7  
NMS-12  16700.9  21808.8  20636.8  20940.4  27388.1  24311.9  26507.9  30798.5  37694.6  27675.9  31586.6  39434.1  
Per cent  9.9  12.5  11.9  11.9  14.5  14.3  15.7  16.0  18.7  16.0  16.9  19.2  
Source: own composition and calculations based on Eurostat data  
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As it is shown by figure 1 the Romanian crop output growth outpaced the 
Hungarian one and the NMS-12 average: between 2000 and 2011 the value of the 
Romanian crop output increased by 2.57 times, while the Hungarian one 1.9 times 
only. 
Figure 1 
Crop output 
(2000 = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat  
 
 
As far as animal production is concerned (see table 2), its value varied 
significantly: there was a slight increase with wide fluctuations. As a consequence, 
the NMS’s share in the EU-27 total animal output grew only a little, from 12.0 to 
14.2 per cent between 2000 and 2011. In the case of Hungary the level of animal 
output in 2011 was around the pre-accession level of 2001-2002, and though the 
Romanian animal output grew twice as fast as the Hungarian one (see fig. 2), its 
2011 level was also below its pre-accession level. These poor results are due to the 
decreasing livestock7 and low productivity, though producer prices increased a little 
bit in nominal terms, while they decreased in real terms.8 
                                                          
7 In Hungary pig numbers decreased from 3.87 million to 3.16 million, and in Romania from 6.56 
million to 5.3 million between 2008 and 2011. Cattle numbers decreased from 705,000 to 681,000 in 
Hungary from 2007 to 2010 and from 2.8 million to 2.0 million in Romania in the same time. 
8 In Hungary in2010 the livestock producer price indices grew to 118.3 compared to 2005 in nominal 
terms, but decreased to 91.2 in real terms. The same figures for Romania were 133.7, and 98.9, 
respectively (Agriculture in the European Union…, 2011). 
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Table 2 
Animal output 
(Production value at basic price - millions ECU/EUR) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27  132809.1  142587.1  135364.5  132138.8  135733.3  135797.7  135515.7  142277.0  151453.5  134996.9  140677.9  157728.5  
Bulgaria  1448.2  1530.5  1186.9  1018.7  1087.9  1129.5  1109.4  1246.5  1375.2  1131.6  1184.1  1230.3  
Czech Rep. 1420.0  1579.6  1568.6  1456.3  1532.4  1601.6  1686.4  1770.2  2101.2  1598.2  1643.1  1765.6  
Estonia  189.1  242.7  216.7  211.0  268.7  278.0  295.8  300.9  342.4  280.7  318.1  387.8  
Cyprus  0.0  0.0  0.0  292.5  306.1  301.2  284.0  279.4  297.8  321.5  331.7  330.5  
Latvia  227.9  286.6  260.9  228.0  275.2  301.7  350.0  396.2  404.0  346.1  369.2  419.6  
Lithuania  486.5  563.8  532.8  515.0  641.3  750.1  803.6  820.0  901.5  687.7  806.2  920.3  
Hungary  2089.7  2571.8  2711.2  2302.1  2169.0  2233.0  2151.1  2260.3  2563.8  2136.8  2241.5  2532.8  
Malta  76.6  79.9  80.7  76.3  72.7  71.6  70.5  71.5  77.7  72.0  71.0  69.7  
Poland  5885.9  7136.8  6399.2  5499.6  6383.2  7586.1  7773.3  8965.9  9639.0  8297.6  9029.1  9989.7  
Romania  2992.7  3863.0  4201.8  3759.6  3465.4  4202.4  4207.5  4374.6  4262.0  4229.6  3855.6  3889.2  
Slovenia  501.6  535.3  522.9  512.8  504.7  515.8  529.6  509.2  563.8  484.0  495.3  535.3  
Slovakia  772.9  732.9  808.7  798.7  763.9  765.5  780.9  889.5  1038.1  813.4  780.0  876.9  
NMS-12  16091.2  19123.0  18490.3  16670.4  17470.5  19736.5  20042.1  21884.0  23566.5  20399.0  21124.9  22947.7  
Per cent  12.1  13.4  13.7  12.6  12.9  14.5  14.8  15.4  15.6  15.1  15.0  14.5 
Source: own compilation and calculation based on Eurostat data
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Figure 2 
Animal output 
(2000 = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat  
2)  Agricultural employment and income 
Prior to the accession, one of the main concerns was related to the social consequences 
of joining the EU: whether the accession would lead to decreasing rural (agricultural) 
employment and/or farmers being better off. Both expectations came true. Agricultural 
employment measured in annual work unit (AWU) decreased by more than one third to 
5.8 million in the NMS-12 between 2000 and 2009 (Agricultural labour input..., 2011). 
In the case of Hungary the decline was almost the same (34.8 per cent), while in 
Romania the decline was steeper (41.1 per cent). While in 2005 190,000 persons were 
employed in Hungarian agriculture, in 2010 only 169,000. The same figures for 
Romania are 2.943 million and 2.78 million, respectively. (Agriculture in the European 
Union..., 2011) 
One of the reasons behind decreasing agricultural employment is diminishing labour 
input as labour is replaced by capital and technology.9 The other is the changing farm 
structure: the decreasing number of agricultural holdings (see table 3), the concentration 
                                                          
9 In Romania labour input decreased even prior to accession (by 40 per cent between 2000 and 2007). 
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of holdings and increasing farm size,10 which result in fewer, larger and more capital-
intensive farms. In spite of all these changes, in the NMS the share of small farms is still 
high11 and many countries are characterised by a dual farm structure, namely the 
dichotomy of few big commercial farms and many small-sized, semi-subsistence plots.  
Table 3 
Number of agricultural holdings 
 (1,000) 
 
 
2000 2003 2005 2007 2010 
EU27  : 15021.0 14482.0 13700.4 
 
Hungary  966.9 773.4 714.8 626.3 576.8 
Poland  : 2172.2 2476.5 2391.0 1506.6 
Romania  : 4484.9 4256.2 3931.4 3859.0 
NMS-12  
 
25806.6 25122.9 23745.4 6789.3 
Source: Eurostat 4) 
 
The good news is that the NMS’s agricultural income increased after the accession 
(by 60 per cent between 2000 and 2009). In the case of Hungary and Romania the 
income increase was more than 2.4 times between 2000 and 2011 (see table 4 and fig. 3) 
due to decreasing agricultural labour input, increasing production values and 
considerable EU subsidies (direct payments) and national supports (top-ups). In Hungary 
between 2005 and 2010 EU support (direct payment + rural development measures) 
increased from €820 million to 1.515 billion, while in Romania from €1.62 billion to 
2.071 billion between 2008 and 2010. However, after the accession national support to 
agriculture decreased: in Hungary from €317 million to 288 million between 2004 and 
2010, and in Romania from €1,100 million to 94 million between 2007 and 2010 
(Agriculture in the European agriculture..., 2011). 
However, despite the noteworthy agricultural income increase, there is still a 
significant income gap between the old and the new member states (it was 9.5 times 
between 2000 and 2002, and decreased to 6.4 times in the period of 2007-2009) 
(Agricultural labour input..., 2011). 
 
                                                          
10 Between 2003 and 2007 the NMS-12 average farm size increased from 5.3 to 6 hectares, however, the 
EU-average was 12 hectares. In Hungary the average farm size increased from 6.0 hectares in 2005 to 6.8 
hectares in 2007, while in Romania it increased only slightly, from 3.3 to 3.5 hectares (Agriculture in the 
European Union…, 2011). 
11 In 2007 58 per cent of NMS’ holdings cultivated less than 2 hectares and 34 per cent between 2-10 
hectares, that is 92 per cent of the holdings are relatively small. Both in Hungary and Romania almost 90 
per cent of the farms cultivate less than 5 hectares (Agriculture in the European Union…, 2011). 
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Table 4 
Indices of Indicator A of agricultural income in the NMS-12 
(2005 = 100) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27  94.9  104.3  105.8  101.6  110.2  100.0  104.0  114.8  109.9  98.9  111.1  *126.5  
Bulgaria  105.1  118.0  94.7  88.6  87.4  100.0  97.5  98.8  161.2  125.3  158.7  *134.5  
Czech 
Rep. 
66.4  85.0  68.8  59.2  93.2  100.0  102.7  118.6  125.1  98.5  113.9  165.8  
Estonia  40.5  53.2  51.6  57.6  94.8  100.0  100.4  142.1  112.1  94.5  138.2  196.7  
Cyprus  95.0  105.9  107.3  98.7  96.6  100.0  90.4  90.2  85.7  92.3  92.0  *92.7  
Latvia  41.1  53.4  52.5  57.6  96.0  100.0  131.8  137.8  117.2  102.4  127.8  140.0  
Lithuania  60.8  56.4  52.3  58.7  92.5  100.0  89.0  133.4  123.4  106.6  121.8  157.0  
Hungary  75.1  79.3  62.7  65.4  99.1  100.0  106.6  114.3  153.4  107.2  123.3  182.0  
Malta  78.7  91.2  90.7  85.9  82.6  100.0  97.5  94.5  90.3  101.0  114.4  81.7  
Poland  61.0  70.2  63.4  58.5  110.3  100.0  110.5  134.9  108.9  134.7  145.2  179.0  
Romania  66.9  114.2  106.8  121.2  175.2  100.0  99.3  76.8  114.4  92.4  89.1  *162.8  
Slovenia  71.5  62.1  81.9  64.6  99.5  100.0  97.4  109.6  99.1  86.7  92.8  116.8  
Slovakia  82.4  93.7  88.6  82.9  107.3  100.0  122.1  128.9  143.5  110.5  115.2  197.2  
Indicator A = combines the development in net value added at factor costs (factor income) and the 
development in agricultural labour input. * estimates  
Source: own composition based on Eurostat  
 
Figure 3 
Agricultural incomes 
(2005 = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat  
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3)  Foreign trade in agricultural goods 
As it was expected, the NMS’ agricultural exports (SITC 0+ 1) to the EU increased: by 
2.3 times between 2005 and 2011 (see table 5 and fig. 4) and their share in the EU27 
intra-trade increased by 4.3 per cent points, from 6.8 per cent to 11.1 per cent. 
Hungary’s intra-EU agricultural exports increased according to the trend (by 2.2 times) 
mainly due to Romania’s accession in 2007. Though Romania’s exports grew faster (by 
5.3 times), it was mainly due to the low base. Their shares in the intra-EU agricultural 
exports increased from 1.1 per cent to 1.8 per cent, and from 0.2 per cent to 0.8 per cent, 
respectively. As far as the export structure is concerned, it has changed in an 
unfavourable direction: the share of raw materials increased vis-à-vis processed goods 
(Csáki-Jámbor, 2009, Jámbor 2010). In 2011, 61 per cent of the Romanian exports to the 
other EU-countries consisted of raw materials, while in the case of Hungary it was 35 
per cent (Csáki-Jámbor, 2012). 
Figure 4 
Intra-EU Exports 
(2005 = 100%) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat
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Table 5 
NMS intra-EU agricultural trade 
(Dispatches/Export) 
 
 
Value (Mio ECU/Euro) Share of EU total by SITC (%) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27   187995  201229  223178  240825  227101  246541  268003  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Bulgaria  436  492  629  912  1130  1403  1654  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  
Czech Rep. 2081  2308  2835  3487  3134  3366  4058  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5  
Estonia  296  328  394  461  405  473  613  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Cyprus  117  121  137  133  127  130  148  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Latvia  314  383  525  602  539  672  769  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  
Lithuania  828  966  1307  1337  1327  1531  1762  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  
Hungary  2109  2353  3462  3850  3476  4058  4721  1.1  1.2  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.8  
Malta  21  18  20  26  17  18  25  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Poland  5139  6347  7608  8847  8716  10057  11046  2.7  3.2  3.4  3.7  3.8  3.8  4.1  
Romania  383  403  646  944  1332  1672  2039  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.8  
Slovenia  273  448  591  640  705  786  787  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Slovakia  983  1249  1480  1540  1520  1739  2189  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  
NMS 12 total  12980  15416  19634  22779  22428  25905  29811  6.8  7.7  9.0  9.6  9.9  10.5  11.1  
Source: own composition and calculations based on Eurostat data  
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Table 6 
NMS intra-EU agricultural trade 
(Arrivals/Imports) 
 
 
Value (Mio ECU/Euro) Share of EU total by SITC (%) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27   184 335  198 797  219 424  235 516  225 296  242777  263902  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Bulgaria  330  413  889  1221  1190  1360  1653  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  
Czech Rep. 2796  3317  3970  4393  4273  4695  5250  1.5  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.0  
Estonia  585  667  910  948  794  889  1084  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  
Cyprus  447  504  587  646  634  700  734  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Latvia  646  812  1003  1188  1059  1207  1398  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  
Lithuania  734  1006  1311  1762  1462  1818  2131  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8  
Hungary  1891  2172  2562  3081  2767  3083  3398  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.2  1.3  1.3  
Malta  307  326  389  404  388  400  426  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Poland  3695  4276  5544  7222  6665  7890  8692  2.0  2.2  2.5  3.1  3.0  3.2  3.3  
Romania  991  1212  2216  3052  2722  2681  2945  0.5  0.6  1.0  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.1  
Slovenia  772  874  1040  1211  1175  1226  1333  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  
Slovakia  1492  1624  2143  2451  2482  2768  3123  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2  
NMS12 total  14686  17203  22564  27579  25611  28717  32167  7.9  8.7  10.4  11.7  11.4  11.8  12.2  
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat  
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In the case of agricultural imports from the EU, the NMS increased their imports by 
2.2 times between 2005 and 2011 (see table 6 and fig. 5) and their share increased from 
7.9 per cent to 12.2 per cent, consequently the NMS are more important markets for the 
other EU countries than sources of import. Hungary’s agricultural imports from the other 
EU countries increased by 1.8 times only, while Romania’s imports by 3.0 times (less 
than their exports). Their shares in the intra-EU agricultural imports increased from 1.0 
per cent to 1.3 per cent (Hungary), and from 0.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent (Romania) 
between 2005 and 2011. 
Figure 5 
Intra-EU Imports 
(2005 = 100) 
 
 
 
If we compare the NMS’ agricultural export and import performance in the case of 
intra-EU trade, the foreign trade balance deterioration is obvious: between 2005 and 
2011 the agricultural trade deficit of the NMS increased from €1.7 billion to 2.35 billion 
(see fig. 6 and table 7) with the highest deficit occurring in 2008 (€-4.8 billion). 
However, the NMS have a positive balance in their extra-EU agricultural trade (see table 
7): €1.4 billion surplus in 2005 and 3.5 billion in 2011.  
While Hungary managed to keep and even increase its intra-EU agricultural 
trade surplus from €0.2 billion in 2005 to 1.3 billion in 2011, Romania’s 
agricultural trade was in deficit (€0.6 billion in 2005 and 0.9 billion in 2011, with a 
peak of 2.1 billion in 2008) (see fig. 6). While Hungary has a permanent trade 
balance in her extra-EU agricultural trade, Romania is just around the balance (see 
fig. 7). 
Impacts of EU Accession on the Hungarian and Romanian Agricultures 63 
 
55 
Figure 6 
Intra-EU balance 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Extra-EU balance 
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Table 7 
NMS extra – and intra-EU agricultural trade balances 
(Mio ECDU/Euro) 
 
 
Extra-EU27 Intra-EU27 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU27   -11012  -10067  -13581  -12446  -11061  -4283  -2233                       
Bulgaria  92  0  85  252  43  249  282  105  76  -260  -309  -60  44  2  
Czech Rep. -12  10  -30  -36  -8  -13  -41  -718  -1009  -1136  -907  -1139  -1329  -1192  
Estonia  40  109  191  161  128  209  229  -289  -339  -516  -487  -390  -416  -471  
Cyprus  -58  -72  -100  -167  -107  -111  -98  -330  -383  -450  -513  -507  -571  -586  
Latvia  52  89  129  276  271  376  459  -332  -429  -479  -585  -519  -535  -629  
Lithuania  982  724  147  17  534  779  932  94  -40  -4  -425  -135  -288  -368  
Hungary  469  593  501  634  483  694  767  217  182  900  769  709  975  1323  
Malta  47  71  78  56  12  70  56  -286  -308  -370  -378  -372  -383  -401  
Poland  550  431  295  499  671  942  1179  1443  2071  2064  1624  2051  2168  2354  
Romania  -709  -778  -551  -74  -211  68  71  -607  -809  -1570  -2108  -1390  -1009  -906  
Slovenia  -21  -122  -222  -164  -278  -285  -302  -498  -427  -449  -571  -470  -441  -546  
Slovakia  -23  -16  -13  3  -10  -12  14  -509  -375  -664  -910  -962  -1029  -934  
NMS 12 
total  
1409  1039  510  1457  1528  2966  3548  -1710  -1790  -2934  -4800  -3184  -2814  -2354  
Source: own composition and calculations based on Eurostat  
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4) Conclusion 
The preliminary results of agricultural accession in the case of Hungary and Romania 
are rather mixed and unambiguous. The following are the encouraging signs:  
 growing production values as the accession provided incentives to agricultural 
production and to utilise natural endowments (mainly agricultural land); 
 increasing farm incomes due to higher producer prices and support given to 
agricultural producers; 
 land/farm concentration, though at the expense of the destruction of smaller farms;  
 increasing land and labour productivity; and  
 good agricultural trade performance outside the EU. 
However, one should not forget the negative consequences of agricultural accession, 
such as: 
 decreasing agricultural and rural employment due to increasing productivity, 
technological change and land concentration; 
 deteriorating intra-EU trade performance especially in the case of Romania due to 
increasing imports and exports lagging behind; 
 increasing competition on the domestic market due to massive import penetration; 
 further extensification of agricultural production structure due to support given to 
crop production and the low productivity of animal husbandry; 
  still significant income, productivity and competitiveness difference between the old 
and the new members states; and 
 increasing share of raw materials in the exports, and increasing share of processed 
goods in imports.  
As far as future prospects are concerned, it highly depends on the reformulation of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, the new budget of the EU and the national economic 
policies and the domestic agricultural situation of the countries concerned (New member 
states..., 2011). 
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Abstract 
The main objectives of the reform of economic governance in the EU from the last 
three years were the following: the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances; ensuring the financial stability within the eurozone; and supporting the 
economic and social development strategy (Europe 2020). These were achieved 
through different instruments (legislative, financial, institutional) and mechanisms. 
The reform has advanced quickly to an upper level: banking union, fiscal union and 
even political union but the eurozone is still going through a period of economic 
stagnation without great prospects of resuming the growth, which reflects the fail-
ure of austerity prescriptions. 
Key words: reform, governance, mechanism, fiscal, budget, imbalance, union 
JEL Classification: D 04, E 44, E 61, E 62, F 15, F 32, F 34, G 28 
1) Some features of the EU economic governance 
Economic governance of the EMU, defined as the supervision and coordination of 
macroeconomic policies at the supranational level, began with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Treaty introduced constraints on fiscal/budgetary policy, which were 
being reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and it was signed in Am-
sterdam in 1997, setting limits for budget deficit and public debt. However, the SGP 
rules had been violated repeatedly in the early part of the last decade, and as a result 
the pact was reformed in 2005 with a focus on structural policies and by relaxing 
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the mechanisms for imposing sanctions in order to block the European Commis-
sion’s recommendations for sanctions within the Council of the EU.  
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the Large Economic Policy Guidelines as an 
instrument for economic policy coordination of the Member States (MS), which es-
tablished a monitoring and reporting procedure by which the Commission makes 
annual recommendations to the MS on the basis of the guidelines and the MS make 
annual progress reports. Sanctions that could be applied were not formally material-
ised but appeared as only warnings without special effects. The Amsterdam Treaty 
also introduced the Guidelines of Employment, a tool of the European Employment 
Strategy (launched in Luxembourg in December 1997). The Open Method of Coor-
dination, with its outlines created at Maastricht and Amsterdam by the Large Eco-
nomic Guidelines and Employment Guidelines, was enshrined in the Lisbon 
Agenda (2000) and extended to other areas of life. However, although successful, 
the monetary union did not cover all the MS and left fiscal and economic policy re-
sponsibility largely to the national level.  
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 and laid down certain principles of 
macroeconomic policy coordination, without changing the essential basic concepts 
of the EMU (Köhler-Töglhofer – Part, 2011). Achieving the EMU is one of the ob-
jectives stipulated in Article 3 of the TEU and in Title VIII of the TFEU which re-
veal the close relationship between monetary and economic policy. Economic union 
as defined in Articles 119 and 120 of the TFEU is founded mainly on the single 
market and secondary on the coordination of national policies and setting common 
objectives for the economic and social development focused on competitiveness and 
employment. The principles contained in the two articles are requirements or con-
straints for economic and fiscal policies of the MS, to ensure financial and price 
stability. Macroeconomic coordination principles arising from the TFEU, but also 
from the SGP and EU regulations are the following: (1) imposing market discipline 
on national fiscal policies; (2) increased engagement of national fiscal policy to 
fiscal rules; (3) strong commitment of MS to reduce excessive macroeconomic im-
balances; (4) a new and permanent mechanism to address the financial crisis; (5) 
strengthening the surveillance of economic policies of MS. 
The EU economic governance reform has been achieved on several levels (Koh-
ler-Töglhofer – Part, 2011) through the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the in-
troduction of the European Semester by providing a better surveillance of national 
economic and fiscal policies, and a better policy coordination at the Community 
level, introducing a procedure for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances, setting 
up a permanent surveillance of structural reforms in the MS and bringing in a new 
crisis management mechanism for ensuring financial stability in the euro area.  
In 2010 three major financial decisions were adopted with notable impact on fis-
cal policy in the euro area and also on the single monetary policy. The first, adopted 
by the European Council, ECOFIN and Eurogroup, refers to the financial stabilisa-
tion programme including the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the 
European Financial Stability Facility. The second concerns their replacement by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from 2013 onwards. The third refers to the 
Securities Markets Programme adopted and implemented by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) for indebted eurozone states.  
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The European Stability Mechanism designed to insure financial solidarity be-
tween the euro area MS is a new financial institution based on Article 136 (3) of the 
TFEU and was established by a treaty negotiated by all MS. The European Stability 
Mechanism will have an initial capital of 700 billion euros and a lending capacity of 
500 billion euros, and by its statute as financial lender the ESB may repay the fi-
nancial assistance even if a debtor state is in an insolvency situation and may in-
volve the private financial sector in line with the established practice of the IMF. 
Besides financial assistance provided through established mechanisms, the Euro-
pean Council has considered the possibility of debt restructuring for the states in 
insolvency, which is feasible under a debt sustainability analysis that may conclude 
the inability to restore financial balance and the need to initiate talks with creditors 
for debt restructuring (Verhelst S., 2011). The Securities Markets Programme, es-
tablished under the provisions of Article 127 (2) of the TFEU, allows the ECB to 
finance the purchase of debt instruments issued by euro area governments to ensure 
sufficient liquidity in dysfunctional bond market segments. According to Article 
123 of the TFEU the central banks and the ECB are not allowed to lend funds to 
national governments, but the ECB may buy government bonds in secondary mar-
kets.  
2) Main governance reforms since 2010 
2.1. European Semester  
The European Semester was proposed in 2010 and adopted in 2011 and under this 
new instrument the coordination process has three specific time points:  
(1) In March of each year, at its Spring Summit, the European Council is setting 
the priorities for economic policy based on the report presented by the Euro-
pean Commission on annual economic growth, followed by recommendations 
for budgetary policy, i.e. for two sets of programmes: a) the National Stability 
and Convergence Programmes; and b) the National Reform Programmes.  
(2) In April of each year, Member States shall send their budgetary and economic 
strategies to the European Commission, in accordance with the recommenda-
tions received one month previously; and then the European Commission 
analyses and submits them to the ECOFIN Council.  
(3) In June and July of each year, the European Council and ECOFIN develop spe-
cific recommendations for the MS on two types of policies: economic policies 
and budgetary policies. During the following year the reports of the European 
Commission assess how these recommendations have been implemented.  
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2.2. Package of six laws  
In September 2010, the European Commission presented a package of six measures: 
five regulations (1173-1177/2011) and a directive to reinforce the economic pillar 
of the EMU and at the ECOFIN Council meeting of 15 March 2011 a preliminary 
agreement was reached on this package, with the European Parliament being in-
volved in the co-decision procedure. On 28 September 2011 the European Parlia-
ment approved the legislative package for improving the functioning of the SGP, 
and on 13 December 2011 it came into effect.  
2.3. Europlus Pact  
The Europlus Pact was signed by euro area countries and six non-euro states with 
the goal to strengthen the economic pillar of the EMU and enhance the quality of 
economic policy coordination in order to increase the economic competitiveness 
and ensure a high degree of convergence for reinforcing the social market economy. 
Based on indicators and principles contained in the Pact, signatory states were go-
ing to announce concrete actions and clear commitments in the next 12 months, to 
be included in the Stability and Convergence Programmes and the National Reform 
Programmes.  
2.4. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU  
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU was signed in 
March 2012 by the 26 MS, except the United Kingdom. Its aim is to deepen the 
economic pillar of the EMU integration and to create a fiscal stability union. This 
treaty deals with three main issues: (1) fiscal stability, i.e. rules on fiscal deficits 
and public debt levels (fiscal rules in the Treaty are sometimes described as “Fiscal 
Compact”); (2) EU economic coordination; and (3) governance of the eurozone. 
Although detailed rules were introduced on fiscal stability issues, the treaty re-
peats some of these rules, and also strengthens and introduces some new ones. It 
states that the European Court of Justice will play an important role in the enforce-
ment of fiscal stability. The treaty provides that the countries, which have ratified it, 
should have a general government deficit (structural) of no more than 0.5 per cent 
of the GDP or the orientation towards this goal within the time limits set by the EU 
(this is sometimes called “deficit brake”) and the general government debt should 
not exceed 60 per cent of the GDP. If, nevertheless, it is above 60 per cent, it should 
be reduced at a rate of 1/20 each year (this is sometimes called “debt brake”).  
The Treaty provides that the rules on public deficits and debts should be intro-
duced into national law and there will be a national body responsible for monitoring 
their implementation. Failure to introduce these rules into national legislation could 
bring the country to the European Court of Justice that would have the power to im-
pose sanctions – up to a maximum of 0.1 per cent of GDP.  
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2.5. Pact for Growth and Jobs  
The Pact for Growth and Jobs was adopted at the European Council summit from 
June 2012 at the initiative of France and provides that MS shall take immediate and 
necessary measures at national level to meet the targets of Europe 2020 and that the 
new tools of the EU economic governance must be implemented fully and effec-
tively. Besides a differentiated fiscal consolidation and favorable economic growth, 
special attention should be paid to investments in future-oriented areas and directly 
related to the economy’s growth potential and ensuring the sustainability of pension 
systems. Solutions must be found in terms of unemployment and addressing effec-
tively the social consequences of the crisis; also one should accelerate reforms 
aimed at improving the employability of labour, and intensified efforts should be 
made to increase employment among young people, in particular to improve the 
possibility of young people obtaining their first professional experience and to in-
crease their participation in the labour market, with the objective that within months 
of leaving school young people must receive offers of employment, training, ap-
prenticeships and traineeships of good quality that may be supported by the Euro-
pean Social Fund. Additionally, effective policies for combating poverty and sup-
porting vulnerable groups are needed to be developed and implemented quickly. 
Member States were supposed to promptly implement national plans for jobs and to 
develop more ambitious and precise national plans for jobs for the next European 
Semester and to use the funding possibilities for recruitment through temporary 
subsidies granted by the European Social Fund.  
2.6. Package of two laws  
A package of two laws was proposed in 2012 by the European Commission; it con-
sists of two regulations, applicable only to the euro area MS (based on Art 136 of 
the TFEU), aiming at further strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro 
area. One regulation is concerning the monitoring and assessing of draft budgetary 
plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficits in the euro area MS. The 
other regulation refers to the enhanced surveillance of the euro area MS experienc-
ing or threatened with financial difficulties. 
2.7.  Banking Union  
The Banking Union was proposed on 12 September 2012 by the European Commis-
sion with a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for banks led by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in order to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union. The 
set of proposals was a first step towards an integrated “banking union,” which in-
cludes further components such as a single rulebook, common deposit protection 
and a single bank resolution mechanism. Later, during the European Council meet-
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ings the components and mechanisms of such a banking union were debated and 
approved. 
While France was supporting a banking union more during last autumn, Ger-
many, backed by Van Rompuy and Barroso, pleaded for a fiscal union for the euro-
zone, with a large separate budget, binding budget contracts and some form of joint 
borrowing for financing a common fund or a treasury, providing aid to eurozone 
countries engaged in reform programmes. 
3) Macroeconomic imbalances and the EU approach 
Thomas Wieser (2011) thinks that a macroeconomic imbalance refers to a positive 
or a negative position of domestic or foreign financial variables which, if not cor-
rected in time, makes the savings/investments balance unsustainable and determines 
its self-correction, causing a significant shock adjustment. Various authors like 
Wieser (2011), Blanchard (2009), Essl and Stiglbauer (2011) see a close connection 
between the savings/investments balance and current account balance, the main 
component of the balance of payments. 
Usually it renders evident a direct relationship between rising fiscal deficit and 
the current account and interest rate increase, but also there is a certain correlation 
between deficits and growth rate (GDP). Accumulation of fiscal deficits leads to the 
increase of government (public) debt, which is financed by issuing bonds. Accumu-
lation of current account deficits leads to external indebtedness of a country and 
may be partially compensated by large capital inflows from abroad, but usually in-
volving currency devaluation and imposing a significant increase of exports. To 
highlight the relationship between the two deficits, there are business cycle models 
SIGMA of the Fed and GEM of the IMF which indicate that fiscal deficit has no 
effect in the short term and has very little effect in the medium term upon current 
account deficit. But Michael Kumhof and Douglas Laxton (2009), from the Re-
search Department of the IMF, have developed a model that shows a correlation 
between the amount of fiscal deficit and the amount of current account deficit, 
which would confirm the assertions of conventional Keynesian theory of the twin 
deficits on the effects of fiscal deficit on current account balance by increasing ag-
gregate demand for goods and services, including imports. Kumhof and Laxton’s 
model as well as the other empirical analyses indicate that while the fiscal deficit 
has an immediate impact on the current account balance, the full effect of external 
deficits occurs later and it is difficult to distinguish it from the effects of other fac-
tors. Models of exchange rate regimes of Mundell and Fleming from 1962 
(Obstfeld, 2001) also showed that fiscal deficits had an impact on the current ac-
count deficit resulting in an increase of interest rates, exchange rates and capital in-
flows, but these findings were countered by arguments of a Ricardian order (hy-
pothesis of equivalence and neutrality), which in turn were challenged by analysts 
such as Blanchard (2009). 
On the other hand, persistent current account deficit puts pressure on the ex-
change rate and its depreciation affects the inflation, aggregate output, budget reve-
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nues and expenditures and hence the amount of fiscal deficit. Considerable increase 
of private debt from large current account deficits may adversely affect not only 
economic development but also the contribution of private companies to the forma-
tion of budget revenues, which may alter the level of fiscal deficit.  
However, these two imbalances may create serious problems in a monetary un-
ion where there is no national monetary policy, and the different macro develop-
ments in the MS and the different evolutions at macroeconomic level among the 
members of the monetary union, highlighted by high imbalances in Southern 
Europe, made the impact of the crisis quite different, obviously affecting the south-
ern part of the EU more. Nevertheless, new challenges have emerged for a common 
monetary policy and for the single currency, but also for the coordination process of 
the fiscal and economic policy at the EU level.  
After the formation of the monetary union, deficits and imbalances persisted for 
a long time, favoured by the competitive deficits and lack of structural reforms, 
populist policies and weaknesses of fiscal policy, and cheap money/credit policy of 
the ECB, but they came out only once the financial and economic crisis stroke 
heavily. The Stability and Growth Pact, supported by Regulation 1466/97, focused 
excessively on the fiscal deficit neglecting other deficits/imbalances with impact on 
public finances and macroeconomic stability. Andrew Watt (2011) believed that the 
importance of public (fiscal) deficit was overrated at the expense of the private sec-
tor deficits. Iain Begg gives the example of Spain, with a good situation of public 
finances in the 1999-2007 period when the share of government debt to GDP fell 
from 62 per cent to 36 per cent due to budget surpluses, but it reached a share of 
about 70 per cent in 2011, due to the disastrous situation of the building sector (with 
a high share in revenues) and probably also due to the difficulties of the banking 
sector and large current account deficits. But it is not only governmental factors that 
may be blamed for populist policies, for allowing corruption and evasion, for the 
inconsistency of fiscal policies, for the unsustainable accumulation of public debt, 
but also the private sector which supported the housing bubble and the speculative 
bubble on capital markets, and borrowed excessively and accumulated huge debts, 
while neglecting the issue of competitiveness and economic restructuring.  
Without a monetary policy, the only instruments at the government’s disposal 
remain the fiscal policy and wage policy, but their influence on wage flexibility and 
free movement of labour is quite limited. Labour costs increased slowly in Northern 
European countries led by Germany but very quickly and substantially in Southern 
Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal) and Ireland. Germany has another important 
advantage: maintaining industry (the major exporter) at a significant share (24 per 
cent) in the GDP in 2010. Trade deficits and surpluses between Southern and 
Northern Europe, due to competitiveness gaps, created a lot of troubles in the euro-
zone, mirrored by huge public and private debts in the first group of countries. 
 Macroeconomic indicator imbalances may lead to financial crises that are diffi-
cult to solve only by a monetary policy due to the liquidity trap. Fiscal and current 
account deficits should be reduced or even eliminated by drastically cutting the pub-
lic spending and by diminishing the tax evasion (estimated at 20 per cent of the 
GDP across the EU). Excessive budget austerity cannot be the only solution to ad-
dress the deficits and imbalances, because the reduction of private consumption and 
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the under-financing of social sectors cannot restore the growth of economy and re-
inforce its competitiveness (see the good example of the Scandinavian countries).  
Improvement of EU governance within the framework of the European Semester 
meant the introduction of a new procedure for the prevention and correction of mac-
roeconomic imbalances, having two major components: a preventing one, involving 
the regular evaluation of imbalance risks and a corrective one, involving remedial 
measures for excessive macroeconomic imbalances. On the prevention part there is 
an alert mechanism consisting of a set of 10 indicators and a qualitative analysis. 
Five indicators refer to external imbalances and competitiveness: current account 
balance, net international investment position, real effective exchange rate, export 
market share, nominal unit labor costs; and five indicators refer to internal imbal-
ances: real housing prices, private sector credit flow, private sector debt, public 
debt, unemployment. Also there were established threshold limit values for the in-
dicators that helo with the quantitative assessment of their progress and the final 
interpretation based on qualitative analysis.  
Predicting and preventing the excessive imbalances by means of this procedure 
based on ten indicators do not represent a perfect tool, as one may see from their 
evolution during the first seven years of the last decade. The conclusion drawn by 
some analysts (Essl –Stiglbauer, 2011) on the basis that Southern European coun-
tries had not accomplished the threshold values for the more relevant indicators is 
that they have proved very vulnerable to the eurozone crisis, so that the indicators 
would have been useful in predicting the crisis and revealing which states would be 
vulnerable to it. However, it should be noted that the financial crisis started in the 
U.S. and propagated worldwide, and American investment banks led by Goldman 
Sachs played a very negative role in the crisis and in the catastrophic economic 
governance of Greece but also of other EU Southern countries. Italy that passed 
through a very difficult period in 2011 and 2012 had no particular problems with 
nine indicators in the last decade, except for the public debt level, which exceeded 
100 per cent of the GDP, and represents the best example that disproves the possi-
bility of correct predictions using the scoreboard indicators. Other issues are the 
importance/relevance of competitiveness indicators, such as nominal unit labour 
costs, also the relevance of current account surpluses, the interdependence in the 
evolution of some indicators, the need to introduce a financial market indicator, the 
possibility of coordinating and correcting their development at the EU level and im-
proving the threshold values, the rethinking of new indicators and how their devel-
opment may be influenced by national government policies in the MS and their 
support for the corrective recommended actions, the role and jurisdiction of various 
European institutions and institutional structure for preventing and correcting im-
balances and the possibility of imposing financial penalties by reverse qualified ma-
jority in the Council of the EU, the acceptance by MS to cede their sovereignty in 
the field of macroeconomic policy.  
All pacts, documents, legislative acts, procedures, mechanisms established in the 
last three years at the EU level aimed at a better coordination of the member states’ 
economic policies, improving economic performance and preventing imbalances. 
But at national level there is not enough political will and expertise or small possi-
bilities to influence the level and evolution of some indicators, linked more to the 
private sector activity. Hence the natural question regarding the legitimacy of sanc-
tions applied to national governments for the failure of some indicators on which 
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they are unable to intervene effectively. However, there are some levers or meas-
ures by which the governments may influence the activity and performance of the 
private sector. At the community level one may see divergent interests and positions 
regarding the use or the importance of risk assessment indicators for macroeco-
nomic imbalances.  
4) Romania’s adjustments due to the crisis 
The evolution of major macroeconomic indicators in Romania in the period of 
2005-2011 is presented in table 1. In this period Romania’s major macroeconomic 
indicators – current account deficit and fiscal deficit – recorded a negative evolu-
tion. Current account deficit exceeded the -4 per cent threshold value in all years, 
attaining -11.8 per cent in 2008, where the deficit of consolidated budget was more 
than -3 per cent in 2008-2011(-9 per cent in 2009), public debt more than doubled, 
to 33.3 per cent of the GDP, private sector debt increased three-fold from 2005 to 
2009 (122.9 per cent of the GDP) and the unemployment rate was around 7 per 
cent. The situation improved in 2011 and 2012 to a certain extent, as one may see in 
figures 1 and 2. 
The speculative bubble in the real estate sector, where prices had soared in the 
last decade, showed a strong increase of incomes and consumer demand, and the 
expansion of consumer credit and mortgage credit made a significant contribution 
to the large current account deficit. Fiscal deficit was caused by the huge tax eva-
sion (26 per cent of the GDP in 2011), black market economy and the rapid increase 
of wages and pensions. A large part of public investments and expenditures was 
wasted, poorly done or even stolen. It is obvious that fiscal expansion led to a dete-
rioration of the current account, and there was a close link between the increase of 
public debt and the decrease of private sector debt in the last three years (2010-
2012). 
Austerity measures taken in 2009 and 2010 at the suggestion and with the finan-
cial support of the IMF and the European Commission were based on a reduction of 
wages by 25 per cent, the freezing of pension level, an increase of VAT from 19 per 
cent to 24 per cent; they led to a large fiscal adjustment and to a significant reduc-
tion of current account deficit. But the crisis seriously hit Romania and this was 
mirrored by a strong decrease of FDI from 9 billion euros in 2008 to 1.9 billion eu-
ros in 2011, a decrease of export markets demand, the decline of domestic consum-
er demand, weak absorption of European funds, a large GDP contraction (-7.1 per 
cent in 2009) and a weak and slow recovery (in fact, a prolonged economic stagna-
tion) in the last three years (2010-2012). 
The economic prospects for the following years (see the scenarios from figure 3) 
largely depend on the economic situation in the eurozone, the main export area for 
Romania, developments within global economy, low capital inflows, the reduction 
of credit and deleveraging, low absorption of structural funds, the privatisation of 
state companies, attraction of FDI outside the EU, the support for SME’s, infra-
structure, education and innovation, the revival of the capital market, the counter-
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acting of tax evasion, the good prioritisation of public investments and the flexibili-
sation of the labour market. 
Table 1 
The breakdown of main macroeconomic indicators in Romania in the period of 2005-2011 
(%) 
 
Indicator (% of GDP) Threshold 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1)Current account deficit 6%/-4% -7,6 -9,1 -10,8 -11,8 -9,7 -6,7 -4,3
2) Fiscal deficit -3% -1,2 -2,2 -2,5 -5,7 -9 -6,8 -5,5
3) Public debt 60% 15,8 12,4 12,8 13,4 23,6 30,5 33,3
4) N.I.I.P. -35% -29,5 36,2 -47,1 -53,4 -62,2 -63,8 -62,5
5) Private debt 150% 42,2 67,7 107 115 123 76,4 71,8
6) Unemployment rate  (% 
of workforce)
10% 7,3 7,5 6,9 6,5 6,4 6,6 7,2
Source: Eurostat, 2012, National Institute for Statistics, 2012 
 
Figure 1 
Change in fiscal structural balance 
(in percent of GDP, 2008-2011) 
 
Romania has implemented a relatively large fiscal adjustment 
 
 Source: WEO IMF, 2012 
 Note: Cyclically adjusted balances are used for HRV and LVA 
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Figure 2 
Change in current account balance 
(in percent of GDP, 2008-2012) 
 
While the current account deficit has also reversed significantly 
 
 
 Source: WEO IMF, 2012 
 
 
Figure 3 
Real GDP growth: risks to the forecast 
(% change) 
 Source: WEO IMF, 2012 and IMF staff calculations, 2012 
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5) Conclusions  
(1) The systemic character of the crisis created a vicious circle of shocks between 
governments and the banking sector in Southern Europe and the markets have 
lost their confidence in European and national decision makers. Establishing a 
banking union without achieving a fiscal union cannot solve the underlying 
problems of EU economic governance.  
(2) The reform of EU economic governance must be accompanied by reform of the 
corporate governance and global governance, also by deploying substantial re-
forms of governance at the national level in order to overcome moral hazard 
problems related to fiscal policy and the financial sector. 
(3) Strict supervision of the private sector and public deficits is needed by means 
of scoreboard indicators (the ten indicators), which may be completed in the 
near future.  
(4) The credibility of European institutions and how they represent the interests of 
citizens is a major theme of debate nowadays. The president of the European 
Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso spoke repeatedly on the crisis of confidence 
of the markets and citizens, the need for less bureaucracy and technocracy and 
more democracy, the requirement of a political union (a federation), but in fact 
we may see a crisis of political elites and a lack of viable visions for the future 
of a prosperous Europe. 
(5) In the last years all that European leaders offered to their citizens was an auster-
ity recipe, which affected demand and investment and has been criticised by 
Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, and led to a chronic stagnation with no 
prospects for economic recovery in the medium term. Still one may choose be-
tween stimulating the demand (Krugman) by increasing public spending and 
investments, credit recovery, the revival of aggregate demand and stimulating 
the supply (Robert Mundell – David Harper) by applying fiscal incentives, im-
proving competition policy, promoting sectoral policies and supporting the re-
industrialisation process. Bearing in mind that capital investment plays an en-
gine role for total factor productivity, emphasis should be placed on SMEs, 
education, innovation, clusters and but also on measures for increasing the la-
bour market flexibility, upgrading infrastructure and good governance at all 
levels. 
(6) In a recent report on the European growth model, the World Bank (2012) ana-
lysed the main components of it: strong–trade and finance, medium–enterprise 
and innovation, weak–labour and government. To remain a global economic 
leader, Europe has to sustain regional integration (completion of single market), 
reduce public debt (big fiscal adjustments), stimulate/support innovation and 
foster competition, reform social security (around 10 per cent of the GDP), re-
vamp employment protection laws and institute a business climate rewarding 
skills and entrepreneurship. 
 (7) Romania did not face a financial crisis but only a sudden contraction of the 
GDP in 2009 after four years of strong economic growth when the current ac-
count deficit was very high, but austerity measures like the heavy adjustment of 
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salaries from the public sector and the drastic cut of social protection expenses 
led to a significant reduction in fiscal deficit but also to a strong contraction of 
consumer demand. A large part of economic difficulties may be explained by 
the poor quality of governance at a national and local level, characterised by 
corruption, clientelism, bureaucracy, managerial incompetence and the lack of 
a strategic vision. 
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INTERESTS OF THE DIFFERENT PLAYERS  
IN THE MFF DEBATE

 
Miklós Somai 
Abstract 
As already well known, the European Council, at its meeting of 8 February 2013, 
reached an agreement on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) which 
lays down the European Union’s (EU) budgetary priorities and ceilings for the pe-
riod of 2014-2020. The next MFF will retain more or less its current structure, with 
somewhat more money earmarked for research and development, physical infra-
structure and education, but substantially less money saved for agricultural and 
cohesion policy. Although it would be tempting to give a detailed description of the 
agreement, this paper rather intends to examine both the way to and the member 
states’ interests behind the agreement.   
JEL: E60, F02, F36, F55, H77 
The way to the Commission’s proposals 
Before the Commission came out with their proposals entitled A Budget for Europe 
2020 there were almost no or very few clues as to what the upcoming proposals 
would contain.1 The first such clue was Europe 2020, a 10-year strategy proposed 
by the Commission in early March 2010, in which all important targets and initia-
tives concerning the fight against poverty, unemployment, early school-leaving or 
climate change as well as fostering a knowledge-based economy were set out for 
                                                 
 A paper presented at the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop entitled The eurozone crisis, 
member states’ interests, economic dilemmas held on the 30th November, 2012, at IWE 1122 Buda-
pest, Budaörsi út 45. 
1 Commission (web) 
Miklós Somai 82 
the current decade. In this document the expression of “cohesion policy” is men-
tioned twice and that of “common agricultural policy” not at all.2 
The second clue came a few weeks later when, at the end of the summit of 25/25 
March 2010, the European Council published its Conclusions.3 This document 
could be read as a direct riposte to the Commission’s Europe 2020 paper: here both 
cohesion and agriculture were viewed as integral parts and necessary for the support 
of the 2020 strategy. 
The Commission’s Budget Review, a necessary and, under normal circum-
stances, important step in the process of implementing the current MFF, was 
brought out in October 2010, several years later than originally planned.4 The 
Commission did not want to put the unity of the integration at risk by coming up 
with new ideas in such a sensitive and contentious topic as the EU budget, in the 
hard times of the crisis. The review came too late to effect any changes in the re-
maining years of the MFF 2007-2013.   
As a very important clue, as to what could be the outcome of the whole negotia-
tion process, arrived in December 2010: the common letter of the leaders of the five 
net beneficiary member states (D, F, NL, SF, UK) to the budget, in which they 
warned Commission President Barroso not to overshoot with the proposals on the 
next MFF (2014-2020) the level of the current one (2007-2013). They meant that 
appropriations for payments should not increase faster than the annual inflation and 
those for commitments should not exceed their level foreseen for 2013, adjusted 
with less than the annual inflation for the whole MFF to come.5 It is important to 
remember that something very similar had happened at the end of 2003, not long 
before the Commission was going to present its proposals on the current MFF.6 
Finally on 8 June 2011, just a couple of weeks before the Commission proposals 
were published, the European Parliament (EP), disobeying those member states who 
wanted to freeze the MFF, voted a resolution which called for an increase of at least 
5 per cent of the expenditure side of the next MFF.7 With this resolution the EP in-
sisted on the need for maintaining the chances that the objectives and policies 
agreed for in the EU 2020 Strategy would be completed.  
Commission’s proposals 
Officially, the negotiation on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-
2020) started at the end of the Hungarian presidency, on 29 June 2011 when the 
                                                 
2 Commission (2010a) 
3 European Council (2010) 
4 Commission (2010b) 
5 British Embassy, Paris (2010) 
6 Then six net contributors had made a strong statement in support of limiting the expenditure side of 
the common budget to a mere one per cent of the total EU GNI6 (BBC News, 2003). 
7 European Parliament (2011) 
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European Commission presented its proposals.8 When the paper entitled Budget for 
Europe 2020 came to light, it seemed that the Commission had taken most of the 
views of the EP into account, as in its proposal for total EU spending it earmarked 
€972 billion as payments, and €1,025 billion as commitments, both representing, in 
real term, an increase of circa 3 per cent vis-à-vis the relevant figures of the current 
MFF. In terms of EU GNI,9 these spending figures were set at a level of 1.05 for 
commitments and 1.00 per cent for payments, showing a slight increase rather than 
a stabilisation or decrease if compared to the originally decided levels for the cur-
rent MFF (1.045 and 0.99 per cent)10. As a matter of fact, the Commission’s bid 
rose further – to levels of 1.08 and 1.03 per cent of EU GNI – when on 6 July 2012, 
in order to take into account the forthcoming Croatian membership, it amended its 
proposals.11  
It is quite an interesting question to elucidate how these two institutions – the EP 
and mainly the Commission, it being the official initiator of common positions in 
the EU – can fix the MFF ceilings at such a high a level as if they had been totally 
ignoring the wish of the net contributor member states and as if it had been realistic 
for them not to embrace this wish. Considering the several billion euros spent yearly 
on the financing of the Commission’s huge staff (but also those millions spent on 
that of the EP), it is shocking to see these institutions working on plans and know-
ing in advance that they would never succeed. For one did not need to be a prophet 
to foresee that in the context of the crisis and the already traditional cleavage be-
tween net beneficiaries and net contributors (better known recently as “friends of 
cohesion” and “friends of better spending”), it would by no means be possible to 
expand the size of the budget, or to significantly alter its structure. The crisis itself, 
and the fact that those most affected by it were the same member countries that had 
for long been receiving massive financial support through different policy frame-
works from the EU budget, did not leave too much room for doubt on whether the 
net contributors would be willing to raise more funds for whatsoever plans.  
However, the Commission, disregarding all the above, tabled its proposals with 
several innovative elements and changes to the “rules of the game” for the would-be 
multiannual financial framework. The main novelties worth mentioning can be 
summarised as follows: 
 the concentration on key policy priorities, in order to reach the Europe 2020 stra-
tegic objectives, as well as to promote growth and employment to counter the 
EU’s economic crisis: 
o €80 billion to be dedicated to research and development within a newly cre-
ated common strategic framework closely linked to key sectoral policy priori-
                                                 
8 Commission (2011a)  
9 Gross National Income 
10 The original levels of appropriations for commitments and payments decided upon at the 19 th De-
cember 2005 European Council (see: European Council, 2005) have in fact increased to 1.12 and 
1.06 per cent of the EU GNI respectively, due to weaker-than-expected growth rates of the European 
economy during the current MFF period (2007-2013)  
(http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/multiannual-financial-framework-2014-2020/index_en.htm). 
11 Commission (2012a) 
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ties such as health, food security and bio-economy, energy and climate 
change; 
o more than €15 billion to be spent to strengthen Community programmes for 
education and vocational training; 
o €50 billion, of which €10 billion would come from the Cohesion Fund, to be 
earmarked to create a new subheading “Connecting Europe Facility” to fill 
persistent gaps, remove bottlenecks and ensure cross-border connections in 
the field of transport, energy and information technology; 
o about 20 per cent of MFF funds to be used for climate-related expenditure, 
but without creating specific instruments dedicated to climate and environ-
ment; 
 the simplification and reduction of instruments and administrative burden, espe-
cially concerning structural funds and R&D funding; the growing flexibility 
within and across budget headings; and the introduction of ex ante and ex post as 
well as macro-economic conditionality in cohesion policy and agriculture with 
the aim of sharpening the focus on results rather than on inputs, and ensuring co-
herence between the overall economic policy and the EU budget12; 
 the introduction of two new resources of their own; the aim of making such in-
novations is to give the EU budget greater autonomy and new sources of income 
whereby the part of the GNI-based resource could fall from three fourth to two 
fifth in total EU financing (see table 1): 
o a financial transaction tax (FTT) to be set at very low rates (e.g. 0.1 per cent 
for bonds and shares, and 0.01 per cent on derivative products); and 
o a simplified and modernised VAT resource to be applied (e.g. at a rate of 1 
per cent) on those goods and services only which are subject to the standard 
rate in each and every member state; it is intended to replace the current ut-
terly complex and opaque VAT-based resource; 
 the reform of the correction mechanisms consisting of: 
o replacing all country-specific corrections (including the most famous one, that 
of the UK) with a new system of lump sum gross reductions on yearly GNI 
payments for only four member states (D, S, NL and UK);  
o and the bringing back of the rate of retention, by way of collection costs, of 25 
per cent of the amounts of traditional own resources (almost exclusively cus-
toms duties) collected by the member states and considered to be a hidden 
correction mechanism, to 10 per cent, the level in place until 2000. 
However, the Commission presented such forward-looking proposals in vain if 
in the issue of the MFF the interests of all member states have to be taken into ac-
count: in accordance with the special legislative procedure, the Council, after ob-
taining the consent of the European Parliament, acts unanimously, so each EU 
member has veto power. There are, however, three big member states which, by 
their political and economic influence, may have major impact on the future of the 
European budget. 
                                                 
12 Thus avoiding situations where the effectiveness of EU funding is put at risk by unreasonable 
macro-fiscal policies (Commission, 2011a: 9). 
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Table 1 
Estimated evolution of the structure of EU financing 
(2012-2020) 
 
Source: Proposal on a Council decision on the system of own resources of the European 
Union, Commission COM(2011) 510 final, Brussels 29.06.2011 
Big member states’ interests 
The first such member country is Germany which has, since the end of the 1970s, 
undoubtedly been the biggest net contributor to the common European budget. As 
for the last five year period from 2007 to 2011, for which there were available data 
at the moment of finalising this paper, Germany alone was responsible for 30.68 per 
cent of the total net contributions in terms of operating budgetary balance.13 For 
decades, the Germans have not done too much to prevent the regular reproduction 
of their deficit; for political reasons or because in other areas of the European inte-
gration, such as the internal trade, they could easily earn back what they lost in the 
common budget, they have been content to pay a proportionally high share of the 
EU’s running cost. Since the reunification, however, their motivation for making 
compromises has weakened. Moreover, under the circumstances of the crisis, Berlin 
faces domestic budget cuts and needs to raise euro billions in capital for stocking up 
of the eurozone’s bailout funds, which fuels the determination to ensure better value 
for money during the process of MFF negotiations.14 Germany’s situation remained 
nevertheless delicate, for the country could not afford to overlook the interests of 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, its traditional region of influence. So, 
it could not openly advocate a quick cutting back on the funding of old policies, as 
                                                 
13 Commission, EU expenditure and revenue – 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 
14 Openeurope, 2012: 10 
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it wished to avoid a situation where too many of the member states would feel 
themselves lose position.  
As for the second country, France, due the significant subsidies coming from the 
CAP, had for decades enjoyed the privileged position of being a moderate net con-
tributor to the European common budget. But this state of grace came to an end 
when the budget related dispositions of the Agenda 2000 entered into force, as since 
2002 onwards France has recorded a sharp increase in both its contribution to and 
net operating balance vis-à-vis the budget. By the end of the current financial 
framework (2007-2013), France’s position may be quite comparable with that of 
Germany (see fig. 1). As for the per capita contribution to the budget, France even 
surpassed Germany, and for the per capita operating balance the two countries are 
almost at the same level (see fig. 2). Hence, it is quite obvious why France joined 
the club of “Friends of Better Spending.” Paris’ main ambition during the negotia-
tions has been to preserve the CAP subsidies, at least in absolute terms. As the Brit-
ish rebate has for long been put on stake against a radical cut in CAP spending, by 
defending the CAP Paris involuntarily defended the status quo for the rebate as 
well.   
The third influential country is the United Kingdom. Its main interests lay in 
continuing with the rebate, which was obtained by Margaret Thatcher at the Fon-
tainebleau Summit in 1984 and which resulted in gaining back approximately two 
thirds of its net contribution to the European budget annually. Thanks to the rebate, 
which for the period of 2003-2009 averaged at more than € 5.4 billion a year, the 
UK has, for its operating net balance, been in a pretty good situation compared with 
other similarly developed member states (see fig. 3). This situation changed only in 
recent years as a result of the British “gesture” made at the end of the negotiation 
process for the current MFF, by giving up a part of the rebate in order to save an 
agreement, but also to prolong the rebate for another seven year period. As of 2009, 
the UK has gradually joined the group of other net contributors for the level of its 
net budgetary deficit measured in its GNI. (See Figure 3) Under these circum-
stances the UK’s priorities in the negotiations for the next MFF could only be to 
protect the rebate from further reduction and freeze the overall size of the budget.15 
Key data about the position of the three above member in the EU budget are dis-
played in table 2. 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 9 
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Figure 1 
Contribution to EU budget and operating budget balance of France & Germany 
(€ mn) 
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Source: Commission, EU expenditure and revenue – 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 
 
Figure 2 
Per capita contribution and operating budgetary balance of France and Germany 
(€) 
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Source: Commission, EU expenditure and revenue – 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 
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Figure 3 
Operating budgetary balances 
(i.e. excluding administrative expenditure and TOR, and including UK correction) 
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Source: Commission (2012b) – EU budget 2011, p. 102    
TOR = Traditional own resources (customs duties and sugar levies) 
 
Table 2 
Key data on EU budget positions for Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
 
Average data for the period 2007-2011 DE FR UK 
Total expenditure, EUR million     11 870        13 504          6 859     
Total national contribution, EUR million     19 081        17 433          9 937     
Gross National Income (GNI) EUR billion       2 507           1 962          1 796     
Operating budgetary balance (OBB) EUR million - 8 155     - 4 931     - 3 619     
OBB/GNI - 0.32% - 0.25% - 0.20% 
Population (average 2007-2011), million      82.0        64.3       61.6     
Total expenditure, EUR per capita 
             
144.7     
           
209.9     
          
111.3     
Total national contribution, EUR per capita 
             
232.6     
           
271.0     
          
161.3     
Gross National Income (GNI), EUR per capita        30,569           30,492          29,150     
Operating budgetary balance, EUR per capita - 99.4     - 76.6     - 58.7     
Source: DESTATIS (2012), Foreign trade; and Eurostat (for demographic data) – 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en  
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Endgame 
There is an interesting game surrounding the MFF negotiation process, a certain 
ritual in which net contributors aim for freezing the expenditures, the Commission 
and the European Parliament propose a net increase in spending, and member states 
band together advocating entirely opposite conceptions of how to spend and how 
much to spend. Then, the process develops into a stage when some authority brings 
the expenditure figures closer to reality by presenting a very economic budget (see 
HvR-I and HvR-II).16 Finally, one or several of the most developed countries seem 
to practice generosity by renouncing a certain share of those headings and subhead-
ings in which they have substantial interests.  
As the deadline for reaching an agreement approached, Herman van Rompuy 
tried to make tremendous cuts to both cohesion and agricultural policy, by saving 
more than €100 billion compared to MFF 2007-13, part of which he transferred to 
subheading 1a “Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs.” Even if only some days 
later, Van Rompuy came out with a somewhat softer version (HvR-II.), the Euro-
pean Council of 22/23 November 2012 failed. And finally, at their summit of 7/8 
February 2013 – the politicians reached a political agreement on the maximum fig-
ures of EU-28 expenditure for 2014-2020.17 The heads of state and government por-
trayed the agreement as a victory not only for their home country but for all mem-
ber states.  
However, are the European Council’s Conclusions on the next MFF a triumph 
really for all member states? The data displayed in Table 3 below testify to the fact 
that the changes in the repartition of financial means among the various common 
policies have been a clear victory for the wealthiest net contributor member states, 
“Friends of better spending” and the UK.  
 
                                                 
16 Packages of proposals named after Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council who 
drafted them in preparation for the summit of 22/23 November 2012, a special meeting dedicated to 
the budget, but the parties were unable to arrive at a compromise on the terms of the next multian-
nual financial framework. 
17 European Council, Conclusions, Brussels, 8 February 2013 
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Table 3  
MFF (2014-2020), as agreed by the European Council of 7/8 February 2013, the current 
MFF (2007-2013) and Commission Proposals for the EU28 in July 2012 
 
Commitment appropriations 
MFF 
2014-2020 
MFF 
2007-2013 
COM 
(28) 
bn € % bn € % bn € 
1. Smart and inclusive growth 450 46.9 446 44.9 495 
1/a Competitiveness for growth and jobs 126 13.1 91 9.2 116 
1/b Economic, social and territorial cohesion 325 33.9 355 35.7 379 
2. Sustainable growth: natural resources 373 38.9 421 42.3 386 
of which: market related expend. & DP 278 28.9 337 33.9 283 
3. Security & citizenship 16 1.6 12 1.2 19 
4. Global Europe 59 6.1 57 5.7 70 
5. Administration 62 6.4 57 5.7 63 
Total commitment appropriations 960 100 994 100 1033 
as a percentage of GNI 1.00  1.12  1.08 
Total payment appropriations 908  943  988 
as a percentage of GNI 0.95  1.06  1.03 
Source: European Council (2013) and http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/multiannual-financial-
framework-2014-2020/index_en.htm  
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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S 
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS IMPORTS: 
PLAYING THE SOURCE AND TRANSIT 
DIVERSIFICATION GAME

 
Csaba Weiner
 
Central and East European countries express a strong fear of Russian gas, yet they 
have done little to reduce dependence. However, recently, some progress has been 
made in the diversification of supply and increasing the security of supply. It was 
not only the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2009, but the period since 2008 
and 2009 has shown how different the conditions of each state are, i.e. to what ex-
tent they could have taken advantage of the benefits of changed conditions and 
globalising gas markets. For a Central and East European consumer, the focus is 
mainly on pricing, and the anti-trust probe that has been launched by the European 
Commission against Gazprom stresses the crucial importance of this issue. Despite 
many criticisms, the EU has made a few steps that can help reduce the fear and in-
fluence of Russia.
1
 
JEL Classification: D42; F14; L12; L71; L78; L95; L98; Q41; Q48 
 
                                                 
 A paper presented at the 9th Hungarian-Romanian bilateral workshop “Eurozone crisis, member 
states interests, economic dilemmas” held on 30 November, 2012 at IWE 1122 Budapest, Budaörsi 
út 45. 
 Csaba Weiner, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics, Research Centre for 
Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary. 
1 Based on information up to 30 November 2012 (i.e. up to the date of the roundtable). 
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1) Introduction 
It has been conventional wisdom to talk about Central and East European (CEE) 
dependence on Russian gas imports and the western Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)2 as transit routes. But despite the common past, the CEE region is not 
totally homogeneous. The 13 gas importing countries3 of Central and Eastern 
Europe have different conditions. They are to a different extent dependent on gas, 
gas imports and Russian gas. A central question is the extent to which a country’s 
domestic gas production can meet its demand. Besides, other major elements need 
to be looked at: on how many pipelines and from how many directions a country 
can receive gas; which transit pipelines pass through it (if any); whether the country 
has a seashore to make use of terminals to regasify liquefied natural gas (LNG); and 
what the capacity of the particular country’s underground gas storage(s) is.4 
The Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 showed exactly the conditions 
of the Central and East European states and the achievements in improving the se-
curity of supply at that time. South-East Europe suffered very seriously, but in Cen-
tral Europe, Slovakia was also strongly affected by the gas crisis.  
Since 2005, several gas supply contracts have been signed or extended with 
Gazprom5 in the CEE region, but some contracts will expire already at the begin-
ning and in the middle of the 2010’s. Before the extension of these contracts, it is 
important to see how much Russian gas will be needed, and in order to enjoy a bet-
ter bargaining position, it would be necessary to show progress in diversification 
projects. 
2) Market changes, with special attention to the pricing 
In the last four to five years, the global gas market picture has changed signifi-
cantly, although these events have affected different regions differently, even within 
                                                 
2 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
3 These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Croatia did not extend its long-term 
gas supply contract with Russia when it expired at the end of 2010. Among the Central and East 
European countries, Albania and Montenegro (and Kosovo) do not import gas at all. They have no 
import capacity.  
4 The issue of underground gas storage facilities is not analysed here, while emphasising their impor-
tance. Among Gazprom’s customers in the region, there are no gas storage facilities in Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, while in Serbia one has recently been 
opened. 
5 Gazprom or its 100 per cent owned subsidiaries have the exclusive right to export gas or LNG pro-
duced in Russia. In principle, this monopoly does not apply to production-sharing agreements (PSA), 
but Gazprom has successfully prevented the Sakhalin-1 PSA project to export gas directly to China. 
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Europe. Several factors have been shaping the process. Among the most important 
are: the onset and the effects of the economic crisis, the sharp rise in unconventional 
gas production (most importantly the shale gas revolution in the US), the surge in 
LNG production and globalising gas markets. 
The main challenge for gas is the way it is priced.6 Since the end of 2008, the so-
called “two-price” or “hybrid price” market has been seen in Europe.7 The role of 
the gas trading hubs and their prices started to grow. As a consequence of the over-
supply, the spot market gas prices have fallen well below oil product-indexed prices 
in long-term gas supply contracts. Moreover, after having recovered from a down-
ward spiral, oil prices have remained (relatively) high.  
Gas consumption fell in Europe not only in 2009, the year of the economic crisis, 
but in 2011 as well, and it is projected to fall again in 2012,8 despite the gas demand 
shock in early 2012. In 2011, three additional factors deserved serious attention: the 
temporary suspension of Libya’s gas exports, the Fukushima nuclear disaster and 
the subsequent decisions on nuclear power plants. At present, apart from the 
weather conditions, European gas demand is driven by the problems of economic 
growth, the (relatively) high gas prices, the strong growth of renewables and the 
extremely low CO2 prices.
9 “Because of coal’s replacement by gas in the US, more 
coal is being exported to the EU, because of weak [carbon reduction] targets and 
because the gas prices are very high here.”10 At its lowest level in 2012, gas in the 
US traded at around one-fifth of import prices in Europe and one-eighth of those in 
Japan.11 
Gas exports outside the former Soviet Union12 by Gazprom Export, a 100 per 
cent owned subsidiary of Gazprom, fell sharply in 2009 (from 158.8 bcm13 in 2008 
to 140.6 bcm in 2009), in which the lower gas demand, high contract prices and gas 
interruption during the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 also played a 
role. 2010 brought a slight further decline before soaring in 2011 (from 138.6 bcm 
in 2010 to 150.0 bcm in 2011), still far below the 2008 level. High oil product-
linked contract prices of Gazprom have clearly been curbing gas demand. 
                                                 
6 Answer given by Jonathan Stern to the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei about the main challenge 
facing the gas industry over the next years (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJMWBr-R9Cg). 
7 Stern–Rogers (2011). 
8 Dow Jones Newswires, 1 October 2012. 
9 IEA (2012a, 2012d). 
10 Stephan Singer of WWF for Natural Gas Europe (28 November 2012 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-environmentalist-perspective). 
11 IEA (2012e): 2. 
12 This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance (or produced/owned by Gazprom) and is sold under 
long-term gas supply contracts. In this paper, we do not analyse the causes of differences between 
data taken from the Russian customs statistics and various Gazprom sources. 
13 The abbreviations used for units of measurement in this study are: bcm – billion cubic metres; 
bcma – billion cubic metres per annum; mcm – thousand cubic metres. 
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In 2009, almost all 
customers of Gazprom 
Export outside the former 
Soviet Union bought less 
gas than in 2008. In 
2009, Poland was the 
only one, which, after the 
removal of the controver-
sial Russo–Ukrainian in-
termediary company Ro-
sukrenergo, increased its 
imports, and significantly 
so, while Switzerland 
took roughly the same 
amount as in 2008. In 
2010, Poland became the 
fourth largest customer of 
Gazprom Export outside 
the former Soviet Union, 
ahead of France, and it 
still retains that posi-
tion.14  
In 2011, 25.3 per cent 
of gas exports by Gaz-
prom Export outside the 
former Soviet Union 
went to ten Central and 
East European states. 
This volume (accounting 
for 38 bcm of gas) is 
more than 10 per cent 
below the 2008 level, but 
if Croatia is not counted 
in this, then it is almost 8 
per cent below the 2008 
volume. Besides Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are among the 
large customers in the region. In 2011, apart from Poland and Macedonia, all coun-
tries bought less gas from Gazprom than in 2008. 
Gazprom wants prices that are independent of market conditions. But if it con-
tinues, Gazprom will have more and more problems with gas exports.15 Since 2010, 
Gazprom has granted various concessions regarding the long-term gas supply con-
tracts, but the best is yet to come. In 2011, 58 per cent of the gas sold in Europe was 
under an oil-linked formula, but due to renegotiations and arbitration cases, this ra-
                                                 
14 As to Gazprom Group’s total sales in Europe, Poland and France had already changed places in 
2009, but in 2009 and 2011, gas sales to the UK exceeded those achieved in Poland. 
15 Bloomberg, 14 March 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-14/gazprom-trips-in-india-
as-shale-upends-asia-gas-markets-energy.html. 
Table 1 
Prices for Russian gas in Europe 
($/mcm)* 
 
 2011a, 1) 2010a, 1) 2010b 2009b 
Macedonia 462 381   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 429 339   
Poland 420 331 336 333 
Czech Republic 419 326 ~3202) n.d. 
Greece 414 359 357 n.d. 
Italy 410 331 331 321 
Switzerland 400 296   
France  399 306 306 297 
Baltic States3) 397 333   
Bulgaria 391 311 310 n.d. 
Austria 387 305 304 259 
Hungary 383 350 348 306 
Turkey 381 326 328 290 
Romania 380 325 304 294 
Germany 379 270 271 294 
Slovenia 377 312   
Netherlands 366 308 302 312 
Finland 358 273 271 250 
Slovakia 333 371 ~3702) n.d. 
Great Britain 3314) 2404) 191 260 
* No data was given for Serbia. 1) Average prices, including 
European operations, i.e. there is no available price data for gas 
that comes exclusively from the territory of Russia. 2) Prelimi-
nary data. 3) An average for the three states (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). 4) There is no accurate price data for Great Britain, 
thus average spot prices at the British National Balancing Point 
(NBP) are given. 
Source: a Vedomosti, 18 June 2012. b INEI RAN (2011): 15–16. 
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tio has been falling.16 According to late 2011 and early 2012 information, Gazprom 
supplies only 7 per cent of its total gas exports to Europe at spot rates.17 Gazprom 
responded too late to the market processes, and has lost its market share in Europe. 
In 2011, the EU’s main external source of supply was Russia, representing 24 per 
cent of the EU’s gas consumption. Other major sources were Norway (19 per cent), 
Algeria (9 per cent) and Qatar (7 per cent).18 
In the CEE region, price disputes of RWE Transgas, the Czech subsidiary of 
Germany’s RWE and the Lithuanian Energy Ministry with the Gazprom Group are 
to be resolved via arbitration. PGNiG of Poland has recently secured a deal with 
Gazprom, closing the arbitration proceedings. In October 2012, RWE Transgas won 
an arbitration procedure for the fulfilment of the take or pay clauses, but Gazprom 
Export will certainly appeal. 
In early September 2012, one year after the end-September 2011 inspections at 
the premises of companies active in the supply, transmission and storage of gas in 
several EU Member States (mainly in Central and Eastern Europe), the European 
Commission launched an anti-trust probe against Gazprom. The Commission is in-
vestigating three suspected anti-competitive practices in Central and Eastern 
Europe, involving Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Bulgaria.19 First, Gazprom may have divided gas markets by hinder-
ing the free flow of gas across Member States. Second, Gazprom may have pre-
vented the diversification of gas supply. Finally and third, Gazprom may have im-
posed unfair prices on its customers by linking the price of gas to oil [product] 
prices. 
3) Gas demand and production in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
The Central and East European countries20 can be divided into three distinct groups 
based on the role of gas in primary energy consumption. In 2011, Hungary and 
Lithuania were the countries where gas had the biggest part in primary energy con-
                                                 
16 Natural Gas Europe, 13 September 2012. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-needed-for-
fully-functioning-eu-gas-market. 
17 This data is derived from Gazprom’s 2011 November Base Prospectus and reiterated by Alexander 
Medvedev (of Gazprom) in Gazprom’s Investor Day in London on 14 February 2012. However, we 
understand that this figure has increased since that time (Gazprom Investor Day, Questions and an-
swers, London, 14 February 2012 http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/67/590264/2012-02-14-investor-
day-london-en.pdf). 
18 Eurogas – Press Release, 29 March 2012. 
http://www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20press%20release%20on%20More%20customers,%20
consuming%20less%20gas,%20in%202011.pdf. 
19 European Commission – Press Release (IP/12/937, 4 September 2012); Bloomberg (4 September 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/gazprom-faces-eu-antitrust-probe-on-eastern-
european-gas-sales.html). 
20 Without Montenegro and Albania, but with Croatia. 
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sumption, but the ratio was also high in Latvia, Romania, Croatia and Slovakia. In 
all six cases, representing the first group of countries, ratios were higher than the 
OECD average, and even the OECD Europe average. However, it was below the 
average in countries of the second group, comprising the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovenia, Serbia and Estonia. Finally, in countries such as Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina gas played an extremely low role in the energy balance. 
Table 2 
Gas balances of the Central and East European countries in 2011* 
(bcm) 
 
 Estonia Latvia 
Lithua-
nia 
Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Romania 
Production - - - 6.2(a) 0.2 0.1 2.8 11.0 
Gas demand 0.6 1.6 3.4 17.2 8.9 5.6 11.6 14.4 
Total imports 0.6 1.7 3.5 11.8 9.3 5.9 8.0 3.1 
   of which LNG - - - - - - - - 
Total exports - - - 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 - 
Total storage capacity - 2.3 - 1.7 2.5 2.7 4.2 3.1 
Share of gas in 
TPES(a) (%) 
10.1 33.1 36.0 12.6 17.2 28.1 38.2 30.8 
Self-sufficiency (%) - - - 36.0 2.2 1.8 24.1 76.4 
 
 Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Bosnia-H. Serbia Macedonia 
Production 0.5 0.0 2.3 - 0.4 - 
Gas demand 3.3 0.9 3.2 0.2 2.4 0.1 
Total imports 2.8 0.9 0.9 0.2 2.0 0.1 
   of which LNG - - - - - - 
Total exports - - 0.2 - - - 
Total storage capacity 0.3 - 0.6 - 0.5 - 
Share of gas in 
TPES(b) (%) 
12.9 12.0 30.8 3.1 11.9 3.3 
Self-sufficiency (%) 15.2 0.0 71.9 - 16.7 - 
* Estimates. (a) Compare it with other data sources! For example, according to national sources, do-
mestic gas production was 4.3 bcm in 2011, similar to that of BP. (b) Total Primary Energy Supply. 
- Nil. 0.0 Negligible. 
Source: The table is based on the numbers of the IEA’s ‘Gas Trade Flow in Europe’. We assume that 
the IEA uses ‘0’ where the amount is negligible or nil. We corrected these numbers with data from 
IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) and Gazprom. However, in some cases, data for correction were only 
available for 2010. 
 
 
In the CEE region, Poland, Romania and Hungary are the largest gas consumers, 
with a combined share of nearly 60 per cent in 2011.21 In 2009, in all countries un-
der review except for Albania (where it did not change), gas consumption de-
creased, quite dramatically in certain cases (in the order of 30 to 40 per cent). How-
                                                 
21 The data was taken from the IEA. 
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ever, in most countries, gas demand reached its peak years before 2008.22 A key 
question is to evaluate the extent of additional gas demand in the CEE region, but 
the forecasts are contradictory. The current fickle economic conditions and uncer-
tainties around energy policies are no help in planning, making predictions or deci-
sions. 
Table 3 
 Gas demand scenarios for the Central and East European region 
(per cent) 
 
 
OIES 
by Honoré 
(2010) 
IHS CERA1) 
cited by 
Roberts (2012) 
TYNDP 
(2011)2) 
Kantor – Booz & Co. 
(2012)3) 
2020/2008 2020/2008 2020/2008 
2020/2010 
Min Base Max 
Estonia 0.0  +8.4    
Latvia -2.5  -20.3     
Lithuania -26.3  -15.0     
Poland +26.7  +15.3 +22.7 +45.3 +51.8 
Czech R. +2.9  +54.3 +23.0 +38.2 +60.0 
Slovakia +6.7  +15.5 +16.5 +24.4 +33.5 
Hungary -1.4 -8.3 +23.4 +5.3 +26.0 +55.6 
Romania +12.9 +16.2 -20.0 +17.2 +25.2 +37.9 
Bulgaria -7.4 +21.9 -13.0 +41.5 +77.5 +110.9 
Croatia -14.3 +58.6 +33.5 +34.5 +86.9 +105.2 
Slovenia -34.0 +30.0 +68.2 +14.3 +35.2 +42.4 
Serbia & M. +2.0 +39.1 +75.5(b)     
Bosnia-H. -32.5 +100.0      
Macedonia +10.0 +8x +7x     
Albania 0.0 -(a)      
1) The information came from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. John Roberts of Platts told 
this author that he thought the information dated back to 2010. 2) Final customers. 3) The data for 
2010 is also an estimate. (a) 2008: 0.0 bcm; 2020: 0.2 bcm. (b) Without Montenegro and UNMIK. 
 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, only Romania has substantial gas production, but 
gas production in Poland, Croatia and Hungary also needs to be mentioned. Roma-
nia and Croatia have been largely self-sufficient in their natural gas supplies, with 
76.4 per cent and 71.9 per cent of gas consumed in 2011, respectively.23 
It is hoped that unconventional gas would bring competition to the Russian-
dominated markets and lower gas prices. But one cannot predict the future of un-
conventional gas in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Black Sea gas is that 
Romania and, as a follower, Bulgaria are focusing on in 2012. And it looks like the 
Polish shale gas euphoria is disappearing, thus opening up to the realties. In order to 
avoid letting shale gas be the victim of PR failures, there are very strict rules that 
should be adhered to from the very beginning. Without following these principles, 
in some countries they will not even reach the point of determining whether or not 
they contain economically recoverable resources. In January 2012, after seeing lots 
of protests throughout the country, the technology of hydraulic fracturing for shale 
                                                 
22 IEA (2008, 2011a, 2012a). 
23 According to IEA definitions. 
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gas exploration and extraction was banned and Chevron’s exploration permit was 
revoked in Bulgaria. In Romania, the coming of the new government meant the end 
of Romania’s pro-shale gas position. A moratorium is effectively in place, in spite 
of the fact that so far, no relevant legislation has been adopted to implement such 
measures.24 In the Czech Republic, a moratorium on shale gas exploration is ex-
pected to be put in place until (at least) mid-2014 as well. 
4) Transit through the western CIS states and Central 
and Eastern Europe 
The bulk of Russian gas exports to consumers outside the former Soviet Union tran-
sits through three western CIS states, namely through Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova. Finland is interconnected with Russia. A large part of Turkish exports is 
delivered via the Blue Stream pipeline in the Black Sea, and gas deliveries via the 
Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea started in 2011. The gas pipelines going 
through Ukraine heading towards Europe follow the route of Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania and Moldova. Gas travelling through Moldova flows to Roma-
nia and onwards. Belarus provides transit services in the direction of Lithuania, Po-
land and Ukraine. In 2011, 101 bcm of gas was transited to Europe through 
Ukraine, while 44 bcm through Belarus and nearly 20 bcm through Moldova. There 
is no free transit through Russia. Among the three western CIS transit states, Gaz-
prom owns the Belarusian section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, carrying Russian 
gas to Poland and Germany (and onwards), and the trunk gas pipeline network of 
Belarus’ Beltransgaz. In Moldova, Gazprom holds half of shares in Moldovagaz, 
including transmission pipelines. In Ukraine, Gazprom has no such position.  
In the CEE region, the three main transit routes lead through Slovakia, Poland 
and Romania. Gas transit through Slovakia reached a peak of nearly 85 bcm in 
1999.25 The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, commissioned in 1999, reduced the sig-
nificance of Slovakia, while Poland became an important transit country to Ger-
many. 
 
                                                 
24 Transindex (21 June 2012, http://itthon.transindex.ro/?hir=29748); Natural Gas Europe (16 Au-
gust 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-exploitation-in-romania-postponed); 
Dąborowski–Groszkowski (2012). 
25
 IEA (2005): 140. 
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Figure 1 
Cross-border entry/exit points of Russian gas to Europe  
at the borders of the former Soviet Union 
 
 
Source: Based on a 2011 map of East European Gas Analysis. 
 
 
Ukraine’s neighbours will or can find themselves in a new role of providing 
transmission services to Ukraine. In November 2012, for the first time, gas deliver-
ies to Ukraine were managed from the west by reverse flow. RWE started to supply 
physical gas flows to Ukraine from/through Poland, while Ukraine reduced its pur-
chases from Russia below the take or pay minimum. The Ukrainians also ap-
proached Hungary to find out whether physical gas supply to Ukraine is possible. 
By now, there are both technical and legal possibilities to pump gas to Ukraine from 
Hungary.26 Naturally, the Ukrainian partner should buy gas somewhere. At the 
same time, Slovakia’s transmission system operator (TSO) Eustream was consider-
ing the construction of a new bi-directional interconnection between the gas trans-
mission systems of Slovakia and Ukraine, but, as it was announced in October 
2012, the Open Season had not identified sufficient binding market interest in new 
transmission capacity.27 
                                                 
26 According to information provided this author by János Zsuga, CEO of Hungary’s TSO. 
27 Eustream – News, 19 June 2012, 15 October 2012. 
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4.1. Bypass pipelines and their effects on transit 
The first line of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, with a capacity of 27.5 bcma, had 
become operational in November 2011, followed by the opening of the second line 
in October 2012. If it is up to Russia to decide, this will not be the last line in the 
Baltic Sea. The Nord Stream shareholders considered a preliminary feasibility study 
for the third and fourth lines, and their construction was recognised as economically 
expedient and technically possible. One of the lines may go to Great Britain.28 The 
capacity utilisation rate of the Nord Stream pipeline is expected to attain high lev-
els, but since November 2011, the first line has only moderately been loaded. 
The South Stream pipeline through the Black Sea will provide a transport capacity 
of 63 bcma consisting of four strings; each of them is to have a capacity of 15.75 
bcma. The earlier plans envisaged two branches, a northern one and a southern one, 
starting from Bulgaria, however, the southern branch (Greece and southern Italy) has 
been removed from the agenda. Gas will go through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and 
Slovenia to north-east Italy, and legs are planned to be built to the Bosnian Serb Re-
public and Croatia from Serbia. In the end, Austria will not be connected to the South 
Stream pipeline (at least in the next five years),29 but Macedonia and (perhaps) Mon-
tenegro could join the project. In compliance with Putin’s end-December 2011 “rec-
ommendation,” the construction of South Stream would be officially (!) launched at 
the end of 2012. South Stream has a very high price tag, and both Nord Stream and 
South Stream spur a huge wave of pipeline construction in Russia as well. 
Nord Stream and South Stream create large additional capacity. Gas transit 
through Belarus and Poland are not at stake. In fact, Gazprom would increase the 
transit through Belarus at the expense of Ukraine. However, the Slovakian transit 
route has already been negatively affected. Transit through the Czech Republic will 
be doubly affected by the Nord Stream pipeline. This is because when completed, 
the Gazelle pipeline will increase transit through the Czech Republic. Gazelle is the 
continuation of Germany’s OPAL gas pipeline through the Czech Republic. OPAL 
is connected to the Nord Stream pipeline. 
A range of criticisms have been made of the intergovernmental agreements on 
South Stream signed by various countries in early 2008, partly because the agree-
ments state that the Russian party has the right to use all the capacity in the pipeline. 
But such mistakes can and must be avoided by at least using the information ex-
change mechanism on intergovernmental agreements between Member States and 
third countries (see the Decision No 994/2012/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2012).30 
                                                 
28 RIA Novosti, 8 October 2012. 
29 Népszabadság, 11 November 2012. http://nol.hu/archivum/20121110-gaz_van__penz_lesz. 
30 For antecedents, see the EU Regulation No 994/2010 of 20 October 2010, concerning measures to 
safeguard the security of gas supply and the Conclusions of the European Council of 4 February 
2011. 
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Gazprom is strongly opposed to the EU’s Third Energy Package, not just be-
cause of the capacity utilisation, but also because of the so-called unbundling. Un-
bundling is a serious source of conflict with Russia on existing assets with Russian 
ownership as well. In Poland, the owner of the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe 
gas pipeline (EuRoPol GAZ) handed over operation and the Polish state-owned 
company Gaz-System became the independent system operator (ISO) in 2010. Gaz-
prom has stakes in all three “national” gas companies (in Estonia’s Eesti Gaas, Lat-
via’s Latvijas Gāze and Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos) of the three Baltic Sates, re-
spectively, so, unbundling concerns these assets. In Lithuania, the Government set 
an October 2014 deadline for the unbundling. The dispute between Lithuania and 
Russia is very intense. In Estonia, the national company must sell its natural gas 
transportation network before the end of 2014, and the Government is required to 
approve the sale. Latvia also announced its intention to unbundle gas monopoly. 
The deadline is no later than 2017. 
5) CEE countries on the way to diversification 
The gas crisis in early 2009 and also the year 2010 showed how different conditions 
of each CEE state have. The two extremes were represented by Croatia and Poland. 
The most significant results were achieved by Croatia in reducing dependence on 
Russian gas. The CEE region has not yet seen anything like it. However, it is obvi-
ous that Croatia’s participation in the South Stream project (i.e. the decision to con-
struct a leg from South Stream to Croatia) means that Croatia will buy gas from 
Russia in the future again. Despite various projects, Gazprom Export has an in-
creased part in gas supplies in Poland thanks to the elimination of Rosukrenergo. 
Such intermediary companies offered a certain degree of diversification in Hungary 
and elsewhere for some time. Excluding Croatia, Slovenia is the least dependent on 
Russian gas supplies and it has the most diversified portfolio of gas importing con-
tracts. The position of the Czech Republic and Hungary is worse than that of Slove-
nia, but long-term contracts with western countries and spot markets for cheaper 
natural gas bring a certain degree of diversification to their portfolio. The January 
2009 gas crisis was needed to force Slovakia to start diversification and consider the 
security of supply measures, to have at least contracts with western suppliers and 
import capacity other than from Russia. With the exception of very small amounts 
of gas imports, Serbia purchases most of its natural gas from Russia. The rest comes 
from Hungary. Romania is also able to buy gas from and through Hungary using the 
Hungarian–Romanian interconnector completed in 2009. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Macedonia and the Baltic States are solely dependent on Russia for their gas 
supplies. However, physical reverse flow is possible for Bulgaria, as in the case of 
Slovakia.  
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5.1. Diversification through interconnections and LNG regasifica-
tion projects 
The European Council of 4 February 2011 concluded that no EU Member State 
should remain isolated from the European gas networks after 2015 or see its energy 
security jeopardised by the lack of the appropriate connections. The European 
Commission’s November 2010 communication on energy infrastructure priorities 
identified the following as priority projects in the CEE region: the North-South Cor-
ridor in “Central Eastern and South-East Europe”, the Southern Corridor and the 
Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan in gas (BEMIP Gas). According to the 
EU Regulation No 994/2010 of 20 October 2010, concerning measures to safeguard 
the security of gas supply, the transmission system operators shall enable permanent 
bi-directional capacity on all cross-border interconnections between Member States 
at the latest by December 2013, with some exceptions. This regulation also includes 
the binding infrastructure standard ’N-1’.  
In contrast to the large projects, the importance of interconnections is (also) em-
phasised. Building gas interconnections has been a long-standing unresolved issue 
in Central and Eastern Europe, but recently some progress has been made. Hungary 
has taken significant steps in this area. However, the European Commission argues 
in its most recent Staff Working Document on investment projects in energy infra-
structure (dated 15 November 2012) that Hungary “needs to increase its cross-
border capacity” because “its current capacity is insufficient to ensure the integra-
tion of national markets on a regional level”.31 The case of the Slovak–Hungarian 
interconnector showed clearly what options are available when considering a pro-
ject that cannot be made on market terms. Looking at the region south of Hungary, 
very little has been done apart from the interconnections with Hungary. The Euro-
pean Commission, among others, points out that Bulgaria “needs to play a more 
proactive part in opening up the Southern Gas Corridor.”32 
Among the LNG regasification projects in the region, the Polish and Lithuanian 
projects are to be realised by 2014. The others are only in planning stages. In Croa-
tia, the Adria LNG project of an international consortium has stalled. Thus, the 
Croatian state-owned pipeline operator Plinacro is examining an alternative project, 
the so-called ‘migration concept.’ In Romania, the project of the Azerbaijan–
Georgia–Romania–Hungary interconnector would develop an LNG regasification 
plant. Bulgaria is focused on compressed natural gas (CNG), and not LNG. The in-
creasingly protracted issue of a regional LNG terminal in the Baltic States has also 
shown how difficult it is to get any regional cooperation.33 In Lithuania, the LNG 
project is helped by the gas quota through the LNG terminal. However, in Poland, 
the maximum share of gas imported from one country has already been set since 
2000.  
                                                 
31 European Commission (2012b). 
32 Ibid. 
33 We do not believe in these Black Sea plans. 
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5.2. Diversification through the Southern Corridor 
The Southern Corridor34 initiative includes routes going through and from Turkey 
and other routes that could pass the Black Sea (both pipelines as well as CNG and 
LNG options) and the Eastern Mediterranean to the EU. The Trans-Caspian Pipe-
line would also be a major project in the Southern Corridor to bring new sources of 
gas to Europe. South Stream is not part of the Southern Corridor initiative. 
Apart from the delays, the common characteristic of the projects is that all 
Southern Corridor projects, except for the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and projects 
through the Eastern Mediterranean, bid for Azeri gas, namely gas from the second 
stage of the Shah Deniz field development (Shah Deniz 2). 
Since the autumn of 2011, important changes have occurred in the Southern Cor-
ridor, but the outcome is still far away. The first crucial change was when in Sep-
tember 2011 BP came up with the concept of the so-called South East Europe Pipe-
line (SEEP), which would have started in western Turkey and would have run 
across Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary’s eastern frontier, representing about a 
third of Nabucco’s length. The second crucial change was when, in November 
2011, Azerbaijan and Turkey started work on the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP) project from Turkey’s eastern border to its western border.35 
The Shah Deniz consortium conducts a three-round selection process among 
pipelines from the western border of Turkey. In the first round of the race, in Febru-
ary 2012, it chose the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) over ITGI36 as a possible route, 
should it decide on the south of Italy as the destination. In the second round of the 
race, in June 2012, the Nabucco West project, an already scaled-down version of 
Nabucco ‘classic,’ was selected, rejecting the South East Europe Pipeline as pipe-
line option to Central and South East Europe. The Shah Deniz consortium is ex-
pected to make a final decision between Nabucco West and the Trans Adriatic Pipe-
line by mid-2013. Before the submission of the proposal for Nabucco West to the 
Shah Deniz consortium, the Hungarian Prime Minister indicated on 23 April 2012 
that Hungary’s Mol, or precisely FGSZ, owned by Mol, was leaving the project. By 
this time, several negative messages had been received from not only Mol, but from 
the Hungarian government, RWE, Bulgaria, the EU or the US. RWE is also consid-
ering leaving the project. 
The South East Europe Pipeline and Nabucco West mean an adaptation to the re-
ality. Main problems with the ten-year old Nabucco ‘classic’ have not been solved, 
and even though progress has been made on some issues, new problems have 
arisen. The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic, or SOCAR, holding a 
controlling stake in the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, can be a guarantee for the 
                                                 
34 The Southern Corridor would be – after the Northern Corridor from Norway, the Eastern Corridor 
from Russia, the Mediterranean Corridor from Africa and besides LNG – the fourth big axis. It aims 
at the transmission of gas from the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Basin to the EU (European Commission, 2010, 2012a). 
35 The South Caucasus (Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum) Pipeline needs to be expanded. 
36 ITGI (Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy) comprises the already operating ITG (Interconnector 
Turkey–Greece) and the IGI (Interconnector Greece–Italy) project, the latter including IGI Onshore 
and IGI Poseidon. 
Central and Eastern Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas Imports... 105 
Turkish project. Certain other members of the Shah Deniz consortium (BP, Statoil 
and Total) will also be shareholders of the pipeline. Certain Shah Deniz sharehold-
ers will get shares in the pipeline that is to be selected to deliver gas from the west-
ern border of Turkey as well.  
According to Jonathan Stern, the decision to court Caspian gas was first and 
foremost a political one.37 But buying gas is rather a market-driven decision. Euro-
pean utilities expect supplies from the Caspian to be priced to reflect conditions 
across the continent’s freely traded gas hub markets. It must be noted that diversifi-
cation alone does not inevitably lead to supply security. And Azerbaijan has not yet 
demonstrated that it is a reliable supplier.38 Moreover, the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipe-
line, if ever built, would make Azerbaijan an important gas transit state as well.39 
6) Conclusions 
Since 2008, Gazprom’s market position has changed totally, while Gazprom is 
locked into the European market. In such a difficult situation, it has launched gas 
production in the Yamal Peninsula and is about to start building the South Stream 
gas pipeline. Additionally, in this situation, Gazprom faces an EU anti-trust probe, 
of which the most important issue is how gas is priced. In order to avoid more arbi-
tration, Gazprom recognised the need to narrow the gap between oil product-linked 
contract prices and hub-based market prices. The series of concessions means that 
Gazprom is aware that the status quo cannot be maintained, but has not yet accepted 
the need to shift to hub-based pricing.40 
Central and East European countries can take very limited advantage of the bene-
fits of changed conditions and globalising gas markets. This is partly due to the lack 
of necessary import capacity, and partly due to the long-term contracts. However, 
some countries have really benefited from the ongoing developments. 
Forecasts for gas demand in the Central and East European region are vague and 
different. Internal gas production has been steadily declining, so in countries where 
domestic gas plays a significant role in gas consumption, the degree of self-
sufficiency has also been eroding. The future role of unconventional and Black Sea 
gas in gas balances of particular countries remains a conundrum, but we do not see 
any revolution in the making. In such circumstances, Central and East European 
countries should put a much greater emphasis on energy efficiency. 
                                                 
37 Rausch (2012). 
38 Ibid. 
39 On 12 September 2011, the European Commission was given a mandate to negotiate a legally 
binding treaty between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline Sys-
tem. 
40 These are Jonathan Stern’s findings about pricing principles of Gazprom. Bloomberg (17 January 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/gazprom-price-retreat-offers-eon-hope-as-euro-
crisis-cuts-demand.html); Financial Times (16 February 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-11e1-9f28-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f). 
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Nord Stream and South Stream can increase the security of supply. In the CEE 
region, South Stream dramatically rearranges the existing transportation and transit 
directions, thus some former investments may turn out to be unnecessary. It is im-
portant to emphasise that the Third Energy Package cannot be avoided by tactics 
when it comes to implementing pipeline projects with either Russian or non-
Russian participation. For example, it refers to both South Stream and the Hungar-
ian–Slovakian interconnector. 
Demonstration of the possibility of diversification plays an important role in di-
versification steps, if only showing Russia that there are other options. Different 
countries have taken different steps to ensure the security of supply and diversifica-
tion since the early nineties and, in particular, the January 2009 crisis, but the best is 
yet to come. LNG and pipeline projects are moving forward very slowly and being 
delayed for long. Acting on a commercial basis, these can be accepted but greatly 
erode the credibility of those governments’ and companies’ commitments.  
To obtain the Azeri gas is a key. By the end of the decade, Shah Deniz 2 gas 
could reach Europe. Nevertheless, in the future one must remember that Turkey is 
not an easy case to negotiate. 
We are convinced that Russia remains the single largest gas supplier to Europe. 
The vision or the goal of energy independence, which has been communicated in 
certain CEE countries, is far off the reality, regardless of what is to be understood 
by such statements. 
 
     
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